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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA

No. 6, November-December 1984

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USSR REPORT

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA

No 6, Nov-Dec 1984

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, published in Moscow by the Oriental Studies Institute and the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

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ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 84 (signed to press 20 Nov 84) pp 213-215

[Text] Islamic Factor in Policy of American Imperialism

T. P. Pavlova

The article investigates into the U.S. policy towards the Middle East in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Trying to adapt their policy to the growing influence of the "Islamic factor" and make use of it, initially the American politicians relied upon conservative and reactionary aspects of the Islamic political movement, as a whole. They tried to neutralize its anti-Western and anti-imperialist trend. The American political experience, however, has shown the inefficiency of the "global" approach to heterogeneous Moslem movements.

The need to make distinction became clear and the USA adopted diversified tactics vis-a-vis various religious forces in the Middle East. This policy takes into consideration social and class nature of these forces. Along with the backing of conservative regimes, starting with the early 1980's the U.S. policy became more lenient towards the fundamentalism. Apart from the intention of the American ruling circles to establish contact with some fundamentalist groups, this change is above all accounted for by the U.S. decision to take advantage of the destabilizing impact of fundamentalism.

The article emphasizes that the "Islamic factor" is used mainly in American propaganda. Its major "thesis" is the incompatibility of the Islamic ideals with those of Socialism and their similarity to the "Christian" capitalist ideals. It is the contention of the author that this line suffers from an obvious defect, for it rules out the use of the ideas of Islamic egalitarianism, which the Moslem masses at large find very attractive. The resort to these ideas is typical of the religious movements which became active recently.

Urban Petty Bourgeoisie of Tropical Africa and Its Social and Economic Nature

L. K. Tumanova

The article deals with the formation of the urban petty bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries of Tropical Africa. The role played by small-scale

production and the petty bourgeoisie in industrialization has been growing due to the specific conditions prevailing in African countries. Unlike Western Europe and North America, the small-scale production in Africa does not serve as a basis for capitalist development at the grass-roots level.

The article characterizes the situation of various groups of the African petty bourgeoisie, which are associated with traditional crafts, modern small-scale production, retail trade and service. It also tackles the factors which prevent the transformation of a petty bourgeois into a small-scale capitalist. The article notes the deterioration of the position of petty proprietors in the context of growing capital and production concentration in Africa.

It is the author's contention that the state alone is able to prevent small-scale manufacturers and traders from going bankrupt on a large scale. For want of radical social and economic transformations, the state assistance to small-scale manufacturers turns out to be of limited efficacy. All this exacerbates the crisis of capitalist development in Africa.

Neo-Religious Movements in Modern India

V. I. Kluyev

In the India of today there is a lot of babas, matajis, swamis, gurus, etc. who lead the so-called neo-religious movements. Using mostly the conventional symbols of Hinduism, they establish a sort of religious-cum-social organizations and enroll followers from every creed, caste, or social group. Their technics are simple but effective. In a changing society of market economy, where the traditional order is crumbling, they act as social healers. They promise their followers a speedy advent of the Satya Yuga, that is the Age of Truth, when all will be happy and prosperous.

To impress the public, colorful and costly rites, such as yagnas and mahayagnas, are being performed. The followers of a particular baba are given a feeling of belonging and an illusory sense of content with the participation in these rites and rituals. They carry also identification marks such as colored turbans, beads and necklaces, which are considered as signs of belonging to a better and safer world.

The article deals also with the babas who by and large operate at the grass-roots level among agricultural laborers, Harijans and Adivasis. Special attention is paid to the organizations of Baba Jai Gurudev (His Door-Darshi Party) and Bastar Baba type. It is the author's contention that having developed political ambitions babas of the kind act as a vehicle of political mobilization of the most oppressed and discriminated upon elements of the Indian society. They turn their numerous followers virtually into a solid reserve of the communal and conservative parties and organizations. This develops a new danger to the progressive and democratic forces of the country.

Man of Decolonization Era in Oeuvres of Maghreb Writers

S. V. Prozhogina

The mystified "portrait of a colonized" was imposed by the colonial ideology to justify the political and economic oppression of colonial peoples. Hence, the colonists tried hard to project an image of a mentally retarded "savage" who is unable to govern his own country and needs to be looked after. Progressive ideologists and men of letters of the developing world discarded this myth. They have shown the true nature of the relations between the suppressed and the suppressor and have revealed the essence of the spiritual evolution of the colonized and their growing determination to shackle off the colonial yoke.

From the early 1950's on the French-speaking writers of Maghreb have been evoking stages of the spiritual evolution of a man emerging from the lap of the colonial society. They have depicted the process of his awakening and self-realization. It has been demonstrated that he had accepted the imperfect nature and contradictions of the traditional social structure. Having realized that progress is essential, he failed to imitate Europeans and became disenchanted with the capitalist civilization of the West. The writers of Maghreb have described his search for ideals and his struggle for the rights of his people.

The "awakened" man, aware of his marginality, "a rebel" and finally "a revolutionary fighter," these are the main stages of the decolonized personality, the features of traits of which make for the real portrait of a man of the time of decolonization.

Reformation Ideas in Turkish Publicism of 18th to Early 20th Centuries

Yu. A. Petrosyan

The emergence and development of the Turkish publicism was closely connected with the idea of reforms which laid down the foundation of the reformist movement in the Ottoman Empire of the 18th and the early 20th centuries.

The Turkish publicism evolved from the treaties of the first half of the 18th century, where elements of the genre of political publicism were only slightly expressed, to the purposeful publicism of the New Ottomans--the Young Turks. The Turkish publicism was thus brought about by the era of reforms. The data presented in the article demonstrate that the emergence of a new genre was itself an offspring of the genesis of the idea of reforms. Whereas at the initial stage of their activities the Turkish publicists stood for an amorphous idea of "westernization," by the middle of the 19th century they advocated the idea of constitutional monarchy, parliamentarism and enlightenment. They sought means to solve the economic and national problems of the country, promote education and culture. Their pamphlets and brochures included progressive ideas of struggle against feudal absolutism and the despotic regime, the reactionary and utopian concept of Ottomanism.

By the time of the first Turkish bourgeois revolution Turkish publicism grew into an important socio-political force.

At the same time, it became one of the main factors in the development of socio-political thought.

Failure of Expansionist Middle East Policy of Fascist Germany

A. P. Demyanenko

Using copious literature and original documents, mainly of the Archiv des Instituts fur Zeitgeschichte of Munich, the article analyses the expansionist policy of the Third Reich towards the Middle East during the Second World War.

This policy was integrated into the Nazi strategy to achieve world supremacy and was closely related to the defeat of the USSR. Nazi Germany intended to secure access to the Caucasian oil fields in order to solve the problem of oil supplies. Apart from this, the Nazi leadership regarded the Caucasus as a launching pad for the invasion into the Middle East.

The blueprints for the establishment of the "neue Ordnung" in the Middle East were worked out together with the plan to attack the USSR. The large monopolies of Germany were engaged in elaborating plans for the seizure of the Caucasian and the Middle East oil, introduction of a new currency based on the "deutsche Mark" and a new tariff and trade system. German experts were supposed to supervise the activity of virtually all ministries in the countries of the Middle East.

So far as the political structure of the region was concerned, Iraq and the so-called Great Syria were to become centers of the Arab world. The latter was to include Syria, Lebanon, the part of Palestine under mandate and a part of Transjordan. Iraq and Great Syria were supposed to sign friendship treaties with Germany, which were to grant the Third Reich the right to exploit the mineral resources of these countries and to keep there their military missions and contingents of troops. Other Arab states and the Persian Gulf emirates were to enter into agreements with Iraq and Great Syria to remain in the orbit of German influence.

The Wehrmacht high command set up a special group of oil experts, which were to reconstruct oil wells of the Caucasus and the Middle East and start oil production as soon as possible. After the oil fields of Maikop (the Caucasus) were captured in early August of 1942, the groups of oil experts started to arrive there. These groups were to move later to the Middle East. "The German Middle East Corps" (Deutsches Orientverband z.b. V.) was transferred to Stalino when the units of the "A" armies reached the North Caucasian mountains. After the seizure of the Main Caucasian Range it was to advance further toward Baku and to invade Northern and Western Iran and reach Basra.

The offensive of the Red Army and the defeat of the fascist army in Stalingrad and in the Caucasus forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw its troops, including the "German Middle East Corps," from the Caucasus. The defeat suffered by the

Nazis in the USSR foiled their plans to establish German domination in the Middle East.

Ming Law on State Apparatus and Clerical Work

The present excerpt is the translation of the third chapter of the code "Da Ming lu ji-jie fu-li" of the Chinese Ming dynasty (1368-1644). This Code has not been translated into European languages. There are two kinds of legal provisions in it. First, the laws proper (lu), which were formulated during the reign of the founder of the Ming dynasty (1368-1398) and which remained unchanged thereafter. Secondly, the additional acts (li), which were supposed to adapt the legal norms to the occurring social changes. Apart from being a valuable source of information for the study of the history of law, the Code offers a great deal of data as regards social and economic problems, the functioning of state bodies, the history of ideology, morality, etc.

The present chapter deals with the state apparatus and principles and methods of its functioning. It also tackles some specific aspects of the Chinese bureaucracy. The laws were introduced to ensure a highly centralized system of government. It was headed by an omnipotent monarch, who controlled the decision-making process regarding the most important economic, military, ideological, legal and bureaucratic issues. The administration had a purely executive function. The clerks had to adhere to the law and take initiative solely within their sphere of competence. The postage of official papers from one office to another was legalized as a main method of taking and executing decisions. This led to an enormous bureaucratic correspondence and was responsible for the important role of the clerks in the administrative system.

The additional acts demonstrate that the central government tried to tighten the control over local princes (wangs) in order to oppose their centrifugal, let alone separatist tendencies and prevent the leak of information abroad.

NARODY AZII I AFRIKI has already published the translation of several chapters of the Code, namely the fourth "Households and Corvee Services," the fifth "Land and Dwellings" (1962, No 3), partly the eighth "Salt Law" (1971, No 4); the twenty-ninth "Public Construction," the thirtieth "River Dams" (1979, No 3); the eleventh "Sacrifices" (1982, No 1) and the twelfth "Normative Regulations" (1983, No 1).

Translation from the Chinese, Introduction and Commentary by N. P. Svistunova

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'ISLAMIC FACTOR' IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DISCUSSED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 84 (signed to press 20 Nov 84) pp 3-14

[Article by T. P. Pavlova]

[Text] The dramatic increase in Islam's influence in the sociopolitical life of Muslim countries at the end of the 1970's motivated U.S. ruling circles to begin planning a political strategy with a view to the "Islamic factor." Its main object became the countries of the Near and Middle East, which U.S. imperialist circles declared an important zone of their own military, political and economic interests. The main purpose of this strategy consisted in using Islam as some kind of barrier to stop the spread of the influence of socialist ideas in the region, in the struggle against forces for progress and democracy. In an attempt to adapt more effectively to the phenomenon of Islam's politicization, American politicians and ideologists made substantial adjustments in their ideas about the future development of countries in the region and the social forces on which the United States could rely to support its policy. In scientific studies and in periodicals, theses about the traditional nature of Muslim society, its age-old religious traditions and the serious influence of religious leaders have taken the place of propaganda about Westernization and about the leading role of the pro-Western intelligentsia in its accomplishment. Special emphasis is placed on the "unacceptability" of radical progressive reforms and socialist views--which are supposedly "contrary to the spirit" of Islamic dogma--to the Muslim countries. By creating the illusion of support for the traditional way of life, American ideologists are striving to strengthen the conservative and reactionary aspects of Muslim movements.

The general idea of using the "Islamic factor," which had already been basically formulated in the last years of the Carter Administration, has retained the goals described above, but there have been several changes in the approach to the matter on the level of actual policy, and this process can be divided into several distinct stages. The first stage, prior to the start of the Reagan Administration, was distinguished by a global, undifferentiated approach to the phenomenon of "Islamic revival." This was reflected in the attempt to regard the Muslim states as some kind of special "region" and to work out a common strategy with regard to them. These views were developed, in particular, by Z. Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser.

The expediency of precisely this policy line was associated primarily with the leading role of the conservative regimes of oil-producing Arab countries in the movement for "Islamic solidarity" in the 1970's, with Saudi Arabia as the leader--a country with which the United States associates special hopes in the realization of its ambitions. American politicians regard the oil monarchies' appearance on the main political stage as a welcome opportunity to carry out a plan imperialist strategists were promoting during the first postwar decades--the plan to put together anticommunist blocs based on common religious beliefs, such as the now bankrupt "Islamic Pact" (1965).

American ruling circles hoped to use the growing influence of conservative regimes to block radical tendencies in Islamic political movements and also made an effort to blunt the anti-Western thrust of these movements. American propaganda efforts had the aim of portraying the United States as the "traditional friend and defender of Islam," and the USSR and other socialist countries as its inveterate enemies.

The Middle East conflict was a serious obstacle in the efforts to carry out these plans; in particular, the problem of Islamic holy places in Jerusalem became a particularly pressing matter, and it was as a result of this that the conservative Arab regimes took a position contrary to U.S. interests on the Mideast question. The unresolved nature of the Mideast problem complicated American efforts to neutralize the anti-imperialist thrust of the movement for "Islamic solidarity." In addition, the United States also had difficulty establishing contacts with some Islamic political movements. The Carter Administration's inability to counteract the development of revolutionary events in Iran and the growth of religious movements opposing pro-Western regimes in some other countries--which also attested to the groundlessness of an approach ignoring the class heterogeneity of these movements¹--necessitated a reassessment of U.S. "Islamic" policy and the more objective analysis of related problems.

The realization of the political ineffectiveness of the administration's previous line initially caused many politicians and political analysts to believe that the "Islamic factor" could not be used in the interests of the United States. In 1981, immediately after the start of the Republican administration, an effort was made to put together a "strategic consensus" in the Middle East. Secretary of State A. Haig announced this in a conversation with Saudi rulers. The unification of moderate, pro-Western Arab regimes with Israel within the framework of this kind of "consensus" was supposed to take the place of a real solution to the Mideast conflict by emphasizing the need to protect the region against the imaginary "Soviet threat." The efforts to create the "consensus" were accompanied by U.S. propaganda efforts to emphasize the negative aspects of the "Islamic revival" movements and their "hostility toward U.S. interests," as well as certain of their features, such as "rabid fanaticism" and the tendency to "reject anything modern" and return to the "way of life of the time of the Prophet Muhammad." The criticism of Muslim fundamentalism² in the U.S. press, intended to exert pressure on the conservative rulers of Arab countries, was also a reaction to the radicalization of religious forces opposing pro-Western regimes in 1981, and particularly to the assassination of President Sadat of

Egypt, which was viewed as a powerful psychological and political stimulus for militant opposition groups, both on the right and the left, throughout the Arab world. The Sadat eulogy H. Kissinger wrote for TIME magazine eloquently described the position of U.S. ruling circles on fundamentalism: "He was murdered by apostles of mediocrity, cowardly hucksters of ritual, whom he had disgraced by transcending the bounds of the ordinary and achieving a spiritual level inaccessible to these wretched individuals."³

Neither the imperialist propaganda tricks nor the extensive use of military and economic leverage by the Reagan Administration, however, advanced the cause of the "consensus," and this idea began to be criticized severely even in the United States. Stressing the groundlessness of the idea of an alliance between conservative rulers and Israel, many influential politicians, scientists and businessmen pointed out the U.S. administration's lack of any kind of consistent Mideast policy. The efforts to strengthen the Middle Eastern link, which was commonly acknowledged to be the weakest link in White House foreign policy strategy, became more active in 1982 and took the form of renewed attempts to use the "Islamic factor" in U.S. foreign policy, distinguished by a differentiated approach to various countries in the region and the political forces operating in them. A new policy line was worked out in detail when G. Shultz became U.S. secretary of state in July 1982 and began his work by organizing a series of consultations on Near and Middle Eastern affairs. The goals of the new policy, pursued under the slogan of "many friends," were declared to be the establishment of bilateral cooperation with moderate Arab states and concentration on the state of affairs in "hot spots" in the region.

This was something like a return to the acknowledgement of the priority of the "Islamic factor," but on a new basis: the recognition of its functional differences and roles, depending on sociopolitical conditions in different Muslim countries. American politicians and political analysts concluded that the relegation of various movements with different social aims to the common category of "Islamic revival" could only be quite hypothetical and that it would therefore be futile to seek a common solution to problems connected with the "Islamic factor." The tendency toward a differentiated approach was reflected in attempts to "dissect" the phenomenon of "Islamic revival" into its various elements. This was characteristic, for example, of one of the most authoritative U.S. experts on the Middle East--J. L. Esposito, who stressed "the need to examine specific cases to evaluate the different role or, more precisely, roles of Islam in Muslim politics. The combination of different Islamic interpretations (for example, those of the Saudi monarchs, Khomeini, Qadhafi and Zia ul-Haq) with the sociopolitical context characteristic of their countries results in forms of political Islam with more differences than similarities."⁴

These new U.S. policy aims have led to the planning and use of various tactics in relations with Islamic movements in different countries and their different factions. Their prospects for use in U.S. interests are evaluated with a view to socioeconomic and political criteria and consideration for their influence on the balance of power in the country and in the region as a whole. Although the emphasis on alliance with traditionalists is still the chief aspect of American policy envisaging the use of the "Islamic factor," there is

also a tendency toward a tactical relaxation of positions with regard to Islamic fundamentalists in general. This is due to the U.S. ruling circles' hope of establishing contacts with various fundamentalist organizations and to the hope of making indirect use of fundamentalist movements, especially their destabilizing effects, in the interests of the United States.

This line is clearly apparent in American imperialism's policy in the Persian Gulf zone. Now that U.S. ruling circles have encountered difficulties in carrying out their neocolonial plans for the oil monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE) by means of direct pressure, they have begun to employ more flexible tactics. Above all, these include the intimidation of conservative rulers with the threat of Iran's export of "Islamic revolution." Placing a particularly high value on the "demonstrative impact" of the Iran-Iraq war as tangible proof of this threat, the engineers of American foreign policy are gambling on its protraction, which they believe should ally conservative regimes more closely with the United States. It is indicative in this connection that BUSINESS WEEK, the influential American weekly, had this to say in a report on one of the Iranian army's successful offensives: "The fear of Tehran's growing strength...could help to accomplish what neither the Carter Administration nor the Reagan Administration could do--the creation of an anti-Soviet alliance of Arab states."⁵ The fueling of anti-Iranian feelings is being promoted vigorously by American propaganda, which spreads shocking rumors about preparations for an invasion of Saudi Arabia under the guise of a pilgrimage by "tens of thousands of armed Iranian fundamentalists," reports the "incendiary" appeals of Iranian leaders for the overthrow of the Saudi dynasty "as a handful of voluptuaries and mercenaries"⁶ and so forth.

The thesis about the fundamentalist threat from outside is combined with talk about a similar "threat from inside," which is associated with the growth of separatist feelings among the Shiites of the oil-rich Saudi province of Al-Hasa, "who have long dreamed of creating an independent Shiite state."

It is particularly significant that American politicians and political analysts did not agree on the possible reaction of conservative rulers to the "fundamentalist threat." Whereas political leaders hoped that the Arab monarchs would turn to the United States, many political analysts, including D. Pipes and W. Ochsenwald, predicted stronger elements of neutralism and "equidistance" in their policy.⁷ They pointed to the existence of a tendency in the Gulf countries capable of jeopardizing U.S. interests--the tendency to regard "Islamic revolution" as "an exemplary program for getting rid of a government allied too closely with the West"--to explain the Saudi rulers' recent inclination to emphasize their independence of the United States and their "refusal to serve as an instrument in anyone's hands." Furthermore, some analysts view the oil monarchs' increasing inclination toward political quiescence as the only guarantee of the survival of regimes depending in the maintenance of the social equilibrium that has grown increasingly fragile in the Gulf countries as a result of their "great leap forward" in the 20th century.

Therefore, there is an obvious conflict between the immediate aim of U.S. policy--the quickest possible expansion of military presence in the region with the aid of "moderate" regimes--and the long-range strategic goal of

maintaining the stability of conservative regimes in the Gulf countries as long as possible.

Saudi Arabia is usually used as an example in investigations of the problem of securing stability in the "traditional countries," a prominent subject in works by American researchers. Stressing that the power of the Saudi rulers has traditionally been based on the interaction of three societal structures--monarchic, tribal and traditional--political analyst E. Webb lists the factors on which the future of the Saudi dynasty now depends, including the establishment of mutual understanding with Muslim conservatives; careful balancing between two polar forces--the young technocrats and businessmen with liberal views and the confirmed supporters of tradition; the unity of the royal family, uniting around 4,000 princes; and, finally, contacts with nomadic tribes, which constitute around a third of the country's population. Many American researchers, most of whom believe that the royal government cannot last much longer, assume that internal stability could be disrupted by the dissatisfaction of religious circles and that possible social upheavals could take the form of a fundamentalist coup.⁸

Experts' apprehensions about the future of the Saudi regime grew stronger when King Fahd took power in 1982. According to reports in the American press, he aroused the suspicions of orthodox Muslims with his pro-Western sympathies and "playboy manner" in his younger years and with his "contempt for Majlis rituals." For this reason, researchers did not share the optimistic hopes of U.S. military leaders for a more active Saudi foreign policy line under the new pragmatic king. Many of them, such as, for example, A. Dawisha, believed that it was most probable that Fahd's position would display stronger elements of conservatism.⁹ Their predictions were soon corroborated: Settling in a secluded spot in the desert 150 kilometers from Riyadh, Fahd soon proved to be a zealous supporter of Islamic standards in domestic policy (for example, he issued a decree on the responsibility of the managers of establishments to observe daily prayers, ordered foreign firms to put workers of different genders in separate facilities, etc.) and displayed a "reluctance to rush to President Reagan's aid"¹⁰ in foreign policy, which aroused the displeasure of the U.S. administration.

Obviously, when the U.S. reaction to the neutral policy of "moderates" is assessed, a distinction should be drawn between propaganda labeling the efforts of conservatives to "keep their distance from the United States" as evidence of "cowardice" and "adherence to the inscrutable logic of the Middle East,"¹¹ and scientific analyses justifying this policy. According to many experts, the main consideration is the viewpoint of traditionalist circles, especially religious leaders.¹² They had noted that it would be disastrous for the Arab monarchs to ignore the anti-American feelings of large segments of the clergy. This was corroborated after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in summer 1982, when the Muslim clergy of Jordan demanded that King Hussein break off diplomatic relations with the United States.

Some researchers, including B. Tibi, feel that the clergy could be used as a promising ally because the ulemaa have traditionally submitted to the rulers of Muslim countries.¹³ The position of the Muslim clergy in Morocco is

generally cited to illustrate this point. Although American political analysts realize that the economic recession, flourishing corruption and growing dissatisfaction in the army could lead to massive political upheavals in Morocco, they underscore the significant differences between the situations in Morocco and Iran. The main one, according to R. Knight, is that the stability of Hassan's authority, in contrast to the Pahlavis' power, is promoted by the religious factor, because "he is the spiritual leader of his people, and because his dynasty, which has ruled the country for around 300 years, is descended from the Prophet Muhammad."¹⁴ The monarch's extremely careful treatment of religious circles is considered to be one of his important achievements.

The following conclusions can be drawn from a summarization of the views of American political analysts on the U.S. administration's hope of using the Muslim clergy in the Western interest in the late 1970's and early 1980's. The majority of political analysts feel that this could be accomplished by means of the gradual transformation of the clergy with the aid of the appropriate policy. Its fundamental socioeconomic tendency is the involvement of certain segments of the clergy in the process of embourgeoisement, accompanied by its differentiation. This process, which is developing quite rapidly in the Persian Gulf countries, is expected to result in the formation of groups with a clear understanding of their common interests with the West. This line should be combined with the intensification of political participation by the clergy through the development of modern forms of "Islamic democracy"--the establishment of local majlises. Since the main decisions would be made by members of the upper strata of the clergy, as acknowledged religious authorities, this, according to the calculations of U.S. ruling circles, would help to quell the emotions of militant fundamentalists.

When American propaganda advertises the path of "peaceful political transformation" for countries of the "traditional type," it generally points to the "wise policy of the Kuwait rulers," who reconvened the parliament, the "Majlis al-Umma," after a 6-year interval in 1981 and thereby gave local fundamentalists a "legal safety valve."

The efforts of U.S. ruling circles to make use of the clergy were primarily a reaction to the Iranian revolution, as a result of which the most important strategic link in the Persian Gulf zone escaped the control of American imperialism. When American political analysts analyze its causes, many of them assign decisive significance to the Shiite clergy's dissatisfaction with "forms of modernization" under the shah, and some even assert that consideration for the interests of the clergy could have prevented the growth of the revolutionary process in Iran.

The change in Washington policy and propaganda tactics with regard to the Islamic regime began in 1981 after former President Bani-Sadr fled the country, when the U.S. administration had to give up its hopes for the "gradual isolation of the clergy" and the assumption of power by secular "moderate forces." At that time the criticism of Khomeini in the American press began to give way to appeals for the observance of the greatest caution in relations with the Islamic regime "so it will not turn to the East": It was stressed

that the death of the ayatollah could lead to "a much worse scenario."¹⁵ At the same time, American propaganda in the early 1980's began to intimidate Iranian ruling circles with the mythical "expansionist ambitions" of the Soviet Union and its alleged "hope of turning Iran into its own bridgehead." The use of the "Soviet threat" has been combined with rabid attacks on public Iranian organizations with a social composition designating them as potential opponents of the "Western choice." Since 1983 one of the targets of attacks in the American press has been the "Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution," an organization which was legalized by Khomeini and which has aroused Washington's suspicions because it recruits new members from the lowest strata and is "subject to the influence of radical ideologies."¹⁶

On the basis of an analysis of the Iranian regime's policy, American political researchers have concluded that the present balance of power indicates that it is expedient for the United States to support the ruling clergy. Certain plans have been associated with the gradual process of differentiation resulting in the advancement of a ruling group whose goals and class interests objectively promote alliance with the West. This is the reason for the American researchers' heightened interest in the stratification of the ruling clergy. The system of classification proposed by University of Texas Professor J. Bill and based on "attitudes toward sociopolitical problems" is indicative in this connection. This author examines three main groups--"relatively flexible and open officials," "extremists" and "the most genuine political pragmatists"--and predicts, on the basis of the current numerical superiority of "moderates," the imminent triumph of the "more flexible and tolerant Shiites."¹⁷

Although some American politicians and researchers view the more intense persecution of leftist forces in Iran and the increasing activity of pro-bourgeois groups of the clergy as signs of "recovery," they believe that politics in Iran will continue to follow "religious patterns." The apparent evolution of the regime in a direction desirable for the United States has motivated American political analysts to deny their own statements about the "lack of precedent" for the concentration of power in the hands of the Shiite clergy since the time when the Safavid dynasty was founded in 1502, as well as the fact that it was not until the second half of 1978 that the clergy became actively involved in the revolutionary demonstrations the Iranian masses had begun conducting in the middle of the last decade.

The intention of American ruling circles to support the clergy was reflected in U.S. scientific literature in the much less negative retrospective assessments of the "Islamic revolution," the ideology of which, according to J. Esposito, managed to "stimulate youth and diminish the appeal of leftist secularist ideologies."¹⁸ This helped, as J. Bill concluded, to prevent an alternative that would have been much worse from the standpoint of Western interests--a radical social coup, the possibility of which was apparent in the strong social thrust of the Iranian revolution during its initial stages. This researcher assigns the ideas of "Islamic egalitarianism," preached by the Shiite clergy, a special role in the "neutralization" of public dissatisfaction (which was aimed against all privileged groups in the Iranian society). It is precisely from this vantage point that American political analysts began

to view--after the regime started to persecute leftist forces--Khomeini's social position as a pragmatic political tactic. In the most difficult situations, Khomeini generally agreed with the views of the "lower strata": "To weaken and discredit radical leftists, Khomeini coopted their ideas and programs from the very beginning...and regularly stressed the populism of Islam, defended the rights of the oppressed...and praised the workers and peasants."¹⁹

The foreign policy line of the Iranian leaders, especially their anti-Americanism, has recently been ascribed to purely tactical considerations by American researchers. Advising people "not to take the anti-Americanism of the Islamic rulers seriously," some American political researchers, such as R. K. Ramazani, see it only as a political instrument by means of which the Iranian leaders wish to surmount such obstacles as the absence of a monolithic Shiite clergy and to consolidate mass support for the regime swept into power by a wave of anti-imperialism.

By revising its policy toward Iran with a view to these conclusions and to the significant discrepancy between the Islamic leadership's militant rhetoric and actual behavior, the U.S. administration is striving to deal with it on a purely governmental basis without touching upon the ideological sphere. American political analysts associate the urgent need to "build bridges" to the Iranian leadership with the need to prevent regional developments undesirable for the United States. This possibility has been confirmed by the statements of experts regarding the incomplete and unpredictable nature of the revolutionary process in Iran²⁰ and a number of "alarming" symptoms connected with the stabilization of the Islamic regime. The latter include the legitimization of new governmental structures, which was one of the means of consolidating the regime, particularly the creation of the Ministry of the "Revolutionary Guard"--the pasdars. This event was interpreted by prominent Oriental scholar F. Holliday as "the expansion of the channel through which tens of thousands of members of the urban poor are being promoted to positions of military and civilian power."²¹ In connection with this, apprehensions were expressed with regard to the possible ascent of a radical leader from among the pasdars, a leader capable of challenging the moderate clergy. We can expect the American administration to use a tried and tested method of preventing this turn of events--that is, it will try to turn the ruling clergy against some pasdar factions.

It should be borne in mind that the revised position of American ruling circles on the Islamic regime in Iran has not affected U.S. propaganda in the Persian Gulf zone, the main element of which is still the intimidation of conservative rulers with the threat that the "epidemic of religious fanaticism will spread to their countries" and the threat of the export of "Islamic revolution." It is indicative that U.S. propaganda has invariably categorized the Iranian revolution as a "Shiite" revolution from the very beginning. This reflected American politicians' desire to play the "Sunnite-Shiite card"--to take advantage of the traditional conflicts between Sunnites and Shiites as an obstacle to inhibit the spread of anti-imperialist ideas and as a means of exacerbating relations between various Muslim countries. Whereas the purely propagandistic approach of the American administration to the Sunnite-Shiite factor--as "the

deepest line of demarcation in the Muslim world"—has remained unchanged, the views of political analysts have been changed perceptibly by the political events of recent years. The majority have refused to exaggerate the importance of this factor and have concluded that it never operates independently and is always tempered by historical, socioeconomic and political factors. The conclusion that the Sunni-Shiite factor plays a secondary role in this complex has been suggested specifically by events in Lebanon. When American politicians gave military support to rightwing Christian forces, representing a minority of the population, they initially believed that the large Shiite community (30 percent of the population) could be won over to their side. The traditional tension between the Lebanese Shiite and Sunnites was taken into consideration. But it was not religion that had the deciding effect on the Shiite position, but social and political factors—their inferior social status and political inequality, which led the largest Shiite organization, the "Amal," to cooperate with other anti-imperialist forces in the country.

Another consideration which motivated American political analysts to assign the religious factor a secondary position was its inability to serve as an effective basis for political and ideological community in today's society. This is corroborated by the experience of Shiite communities in the Persian Gulf countries. American researchers have noted that their main feature is social heterogeneity. They have observed that class affiliation is the factor determining the degree of susceptibility to Khomeini's "incendiary" appeals: Whereas the poorest strata of the Shiite population, especially the workers of Saudi oil fields, are relatively vulnerable to the effects of "militant fundamentalism," wealthier strata have had a different reaction to its slogans. Groups of influential Shiite merchants, entrepreneurs and businessmen in Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE (who include many immigrants from Iran) retain only symbolic devotion to their "Iranian past." Commenting on the prevailing opinions of these Shiites, NEWSWEEK, the political weekly, remarked that these strata "regard revolution as the worst thing for business and...do not want to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs."²² The thesis that the influence of the "Shiite factor" could successfully counteract this turn of social and political events is corroborated, according to American observers, by events in Iraq during the war with Iran.²³ The numerical superiority of the Shiite population with its vast strata of the poor, the dissatisfaction of the Shiite clergy with Ba'ath policy and other factors were regarded as prerequisites for a Shiite coup. According to American political analysts, the deciding role in the "survival" of the present regime in Iraq was the Ba'ath leaders' decision to pacify the Shiites by allocating large sums for the improvement of living conditions for the poor and for religious purposes, marked respect for the Shiite clergy and Shiite beliefs, the encouragement of Shiites to participate more widely in public administration, etc.

In this way, American political scientists who analyze the political experience of recent years conclude that the "Shiite factor" is not an effective basis for unity.

Another important feature of U.S. Middle East policy is the recognition of the heterogeneity of Islamic fundamentalism by American politicians²⁴ and the

existence of a broad range of various currents with differing social aims and political tactics--from moderate to extremist. American political scientists and politicians associate these differences with the need to use various currents in the interests of the United States. Avoiding superficial analogies based on the similarity of declared goals, they single out the particular currents whose interests make them objective allies of the bourgeoisie. This is clearly apparent, in particular, in a study by A. W. Wenner and M. S. Ali of the recent evolution of the largest fundamentalist movement--the Egyptian "Muslim Brotherhood." In this work they constantly point out the "favorable"--from the bourgeois standpoint--tendency in the evolution of the political, socioeconomic and ideological doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood in recent decades. These authors believe that this current has turned into a "truly pragmatic political organization" willing to establish contacts with other political forces. In their opinion, this is attested to by the radical change in the Muslim Brotherhood's attitude toward the multi-party system, which was described as a "Western instrument for the division of the Islamic brotherhood" in the time of the association's founder, Hassan al-Banna. Current publications of the Muslim Brotherhood extol "democracy, which has created opportunities for all ideas and frames of mind, in contrast to a dictatorship, in which only the ideas of the ruler are allowed."

In the views of American political analysts, the transformation of the "Brotherhood's" economic ideal is particularly indicative. In al-Banna's time, it was distinguished by features of "Islamic socialism," "But now the Muslim Brotherhood has come over to the 'capitalist camp,' announcing in its latest publications that private ownership, with few exceptions, is the basis of Islam...because it serves as a source of zakat and systems of inheritance, that private ownership should extend to all means of production, including the land." A. W. Wenner and M. S. Ali attribute the evolution of Muslim Brotherhood theories to the many members of the urban middle class who are now active in the organization. As a result of this, "the organization's current economic program addresses the urban petty bourgeoisie, with its firm belief in the principle of private property and capitalist ideology and its willingness to adopt a platform justifying radical changes within the framework of convenient capitalist relations with the retention of traditional convictions."²⁵

The pragmatic aim of these studies, in which adherence to the capitalist socioeconomic system is raised above "traditional ideological convictions," is obvious. It consists in the denial of any conflict between capitalist standards and Islamic tradition. The same goal is served by the efforts to obscure the fundamentalists' desire to put an end to the existing order by force, as well as by the emphasis on Egypt's characteristic "peaceful coexistence of Islamic reformist thinking with other ideologies...including European liberalism and local nationalism."²⁶ These tendentious studies have been assigned the role of a scientific basis for the recommendations Washington addresses to "friendly" governments, advising them to overcome their differences and "accommodate and legitimize fundamentalist groups, with the exception of extremists." According to American political analysts, the alternative could be the convergence of fundamentalists with leftist forces. As for ultra-extremist groups, Washington's propaganda tactics are based on

the emphasis of their sympathy for leftist forces, which was clearly apparent after Sadat's assassination when the U.S. press focused attention on the alleged "close contacts" between Islamic groups and the leftist opposition in Egypt.

Another way in which the "Islamic factor" is used in U.S. propaganda tactics consists in discrediting the antiexploitative and antibourgeois Islamic theories as "borrowed" ideas and as ideas "contrary to the true spirit of Islam" in order to undermine and weaken progressive governments pursuing an anti-imperialist policy in the Muslim states and the national liberation and democratic movements making frequent use of religious slogans. The White House's special "interest" in Libya is partly due to the hope of "winning Islam over" from the forces fighting for social equality and justice. American ruling circles see the ideological influence of Libyan President Qadhafi's propaganda, appealing for the satisfaction of the desire of the Muslim masses for social justice, as a serious threat to the stability of pro-Western regimes. The need to liquidate the Qadhafi regime is substantiated with false arguments about the need to neutralize the "epicenter of religious extremism" as one form of "international terrorism." Although the United States is relying primarily on economic sanctions to weaken the Libyan regime, it is also striving for its political isolation in the "Muslim" and African world.

For several years American propaganda has underscored the threat of the creation of a "great Libya as a socialist pan-Islamic state." On the pretext of repulsing this imaginary "threat," the United States is supplying weapons to the governments of Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and some other countries, hoping to thereby attach them more closely to its own policy. American politicians also regard the "Libyan threat" as an extremely effective way of influencing Egyptian President Mubarak. To convince the Muslim public of the need for pro-Western regimes to stifle opposition liberation and democratic movements with the aid of the United States, the American press labels their members "accomplices of the Libyan expansionists" paving the way for the creation of a "pro-Soviet North African Muslim Republic." In other words, in North Africa the "Qadhafi threat" performs the same function in U.S. propaganda as the "Khomeini threat" performs in the Persian Gulf zone, with the sole significant difference that the statements about the "communist content" of Islamic fundamentalism are much louder in North Africa. This is due to the varying degrees of danger these regimes represent to U.S. imperialist interests.

To keep the countries of the region firmly within the world capitalist economic system and force them to follow in the wake of Western foreign policy, the United States is also using Islam in more "subtle" propaganda, conducted on the level of "analytical discussions" and designed for educated strata of the population, strata with considerable influence on public opinion and policymaking in the Muslim countries. In an effort to counteract the growing appeal of scientific socialist ideas, American politicians and political scientists are advancing the theory that Islamic values and ideals are incompatible with "godless" Marxist ideas, that the former are similar to "Christian" capitalist ideals, that "all religions are united in today's world" and so

forth. The great significance the United States attaches to these theories is attested to by the recruitment of prominent Oriental scholars to elaborate them. A characteristic example is the series of arguments about the presence of "points of contact" between the "Muslim world" and the West in the works of W. Zartman, the president of the American Middle East Research Associates: "In view of the fact that Islamic values give priority to the individual and frequently find ingenious ways of reconciling individual and group interests, they...represent no obstacle to mutual understanding between Americans and the inhabitants of Muslim countries.... We also declare that our society is based on many of these values."²⁷

Developing the idea of the absence of any "fundamental" conflicts between bourgeois ideology and Islam, his colleague, University of California Professor Elias Tuma points out the "antagonism" between the Muslim religion and socialism. Stressing that "Islam and the two other prevailing religions in the Middle East, Christianity and Judaism, tolerate inequality, rationalize it and defend private property," he states: "Islam does not encourage socialism or the equal distribution of wealth or income.... In other words, Middle Eastern socialism can be regarded as a means of pacifying the masses and maintaining the existing authority in these countries."²⁸ Fordham University Professor J. P. Angelis also questions the connection between the socialist orientation and scientific socialism in his article "Political Culture in Algeria," in which he states that since the "Islamic component of socialism is still the most prominent feature of contemporary ideology, ...socialism is of no meaning to Algerian ideologists outside the context of Islam."²⁹

In spite of the grand scales it acquired under the Carter Administration, propaganda in the language of "interreligious dialogue" has not, as American experts admit, achieved the desired goal of a perceptible decline in anti-Western, anti-American feelings in the Muslim countries. Viewing them as "excesses of self-determination," W. Zartman regrets that the American society's inherent "rationalism and common sense cannot be imported" by Middle Eastern countries.

The development of "dialogue" with Muslim countries will necessitate the revision of American propaganda. Special importance is being attached to the revision of the traditional approach to the Arabs. For example, S. Slade, a U.S. administration scientific consultant, has noted that the Arabs "are still one of the few ethnic groups that can be abused with impunity in the United States" and has written about the need to give Americans "a more positive image of the Arab."³⁰ The recommendations to reject the "extremely aggressive stereotype of the Arab" and the tendency to depict Islam "as an anti-Christian and anti-Semitic doctrine" also have another important purpose--to strengthen the influence of U.S. propaganda in the Muslim countries. Although Washington has considerable incentive to change the nature of propaganda, this will nevertheless be extremely difficult because it is contrary to the political goals of the Zionist groups with so much influence in the U.S. mass media.

Therefore, the leading tendency in the evolution of the U.S. employment of the "Islamic factor" is a departure from generalizations and "global" plans for the entire "Muslim world" or the entire movement for "Islamic solidarity"

and a move toward the precise differentiation of various religious movements and even their different factions. This evolution reflects a realization of the heterogeneity of Islamic movements and attempts to work out the appropriate tactics for dealings with different religious forces.

Although American politicians rely mainly on conservative traditionalist regimes and groups in the region, they have not confined their plans to the use of only these traditionalist forces. In recent years American ruling circles have taken an interest in certain fundamentalist movements capable of influencing the situation in various "hot spots" in the region. In addition to the use of the destabilizing influence of fundamentalists in the U.S. interest, the possibility of establishing "mutual understanding" with their "moderate" groups is also being considered. Since the American administration has been unable as yet to make direct contact with the fundamentalists (their leaders will not agree to this), it is striving to direct their actions in its own interests by using U.S. allies in the Middle East. Imperialist circles have also placed special hopes in the reinforcement of the pro-bourgeois members of the Islamic regime in Iran.

The main lessons the American administration learned from the events in Iran can be summarized as the following. First of all, the importance of taking the interests of the clergy into account in the policy of pro-Western regimes as an important stabilizing factor has been acknowledged. There is the hope that certain strata of the Muslim clergy will gradually grow more bourgeois and less anti-American. In the second place, it has been acknowledged that the religious form of revolution is more favorable for the West than its alternative, because religious elements can be used to impede the development of the revolutionary process.

The United States associates its main strategic goal of weakening revolutionary democratic governments and liberation movements in the Muslim countries with the prevention of cooperation by religious and secular forces against imperialism and exploitation. The American administration is stimulating the destabilizing effects of the "Islamic factor" by fueling religious conflicts and provoking clashes between religious sects, particularly between Sunnites and Shiites. Another of the main theses of American propaganda is the thesis that Islamic ideals are "incompatible" with socialist ideals and similar to "Christian," capitalist ideals. The success of this propaganda is quite dubious because it precludes the use of the idea of "Islamic egalitarianism," which appeals to the broad Muslim masses and which has been a salient feature of the active religious movements of recent years.

FOOTNOTES

1. The class essence of various Islamic movements has been described in detail in works by Soviet researchers (see S. L. Agayev, "Iranskaya revolyutsiya, SShA i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost'. 444 dnya v zalozhnikakh" [The Iranian Revolution, the United States and International Security. Taken Hostage for 444 Days], Moscow, 1984; A. I. Ionova, "Islam v Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii: problemy sovremennoy ideynoy evolyutsii"

[Islam in Southeast Asia: Contemporary Ideological Evolution], Moscow, 1981; Z. I. Levin, "Razvitiye arabskoy obshchestvennoy mysli" [The Development of Arab Social Thought], Moscow, 1979; L. R. Polonskaya and A. Kh. Vafa, "Vostok: idei i ideologi" [The East: Ideas and Ideologists], Moscow, 1982; M. T. Stepanyants, "Musul'manskiye kontseptsii v filosofii i politike (XIX-XX vv.)" [Muslim Philosophical and Political Theories (19th-20th Centuries)], Moscow, 1982; R. A. Ul'yanovskiy, "The Iranian Revolution and Its Distinctive Features," *KOMMUNIST*, 1982, No 10.

2. Fundamentalism (adherence to the principles of Islam in its earliest form) is now an influential political force as well as an ideological current. Members of the movement have declared its ideological goal to be a return to the standards and traditions of early Islam (prior to the end of the era of the "just" caliphs--before 662). Fundamentalist doctrines are distinguished by a selective approach to several basic Islamic precepts and an emphasis on political action. On the social level, fundamentalism is distinguished by rejection of capitalism "of the Western type" and of communism and the allegation that some kind of "Islamic order" can be established (a utopian combination of "private ownership by workers" and social justice). The most characteristic feature of fundamentalism is that many of its movements have the political aim of overthrowing the existing order by force.

In addition to fundamentalism, there are two other currents in the Islamic movement--traditionalism and reformism. The first unites the supporters of not "original" Islam, as in the case of the fundamentalists, but a later form of traditional Islam--that is, essentially the traditional interpretations prevailing prior to the early 19th century. As for reformist ideologists, who have been more active in the Muslim countries since the end of the 19th century, one of their main goals is the justification of the separation of secular and religious facets of public life.

3. *TIME*, New York, 19 October 1981, p 29.
4. *MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL*, Washington, Summer 1982, p 419.
5. *BUSINESS WEEK*, New York, 24 May 1982, p 43.
6. *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, New York, Spring 1983, p 910.
7. *ORBIS*, 1980, No 1, p 29.
8. See, for example, *TIME*, 5 February 1983, p 11.
9. *MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL*, Winter 1983, pp 46, 53.
10. *U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT*, 9 May 1983, p 45.
11. *Ibid.*, 6 June 1983, p 48.

12. TIME, 28 June 1982, p 23.
13. MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Winter 1983, p 4.
14. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 1 March 1982, p 32.
15. TIME, 14 September 1981, p 12.
16. MERIP REPORTS, Washington, March-April 1983, p 18.
17. MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Summer 1982, pp 437-438.
18. MIDDLE EAST, London, November 1982, p 65.
19. MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Winter 1982, p 43.
20. Ibid., Spring 1983, p 284.
21. MERIP REPORTS, March-April 1983, p 7.
22. NEWSWEEK, Dayton (Ohio), 31 May 1982, p 28.
23. TIME, 9 August 1982, p 10; NEWSWEEK, 26 July 1982, p 31.
24. See, for example, R. H. Dekmejian, "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival," MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Winter 1980, p 2.
25. MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Summer 1982, p 361.
26. Ibid., p 337.
27. Ibid., Spring 1981, p 171.
28. Ibid., Autumn 1980, p 432.
29. Ibid., Spring 1981, p 194.
30. Ibid., pp 143-144.

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INTERNATIONAL

POLITICAL, SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF NEW INDIAN RELIGIOUS CULTS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 84 (signed to press 20 Nov 84) pp 25-34

[Article by B. I. Klyuyev: "Neoreligious Movements in Today's India"]

[Text] One of the characteristic features of Indian social life and, to some degree, Indian politics in the last 10-15 years has been the appearance and rapidly growing influence of various neoreligious cults, as well as individual holy men, divine individuals, gurus and swamis (teachers), yogis and tantrics, astrologers and prophets with a huge and constantly growing body of clients. These cults are called neoreligious (and sometimes supra-religious) because although their leaders usually employ some of the postulates, symbols and practices of traditional Hinduism, they invent their own rituals and have their own system of views and cult practices, and these can deviate considerably from orthodox Hinduism or even be contrary to it. Representatives of the latter generally refer to the latter-day preachers in scornful terms, calling them jagat-gurus ("jet-age gurus"), pseudo-gurus and even "frauds undermining the bases of the true faith."

The crux of the matter is that when the jagat-gurus recruit disciples and followers, they usually pay no attention to their caste, or even to their religion--an unpardonable sin in the eyes of the traditional Hindu religious functionaries (whose sphere of activity is limited precisely by caste and religion). The new gurus reject the centuries-old rituals and traditional high status of religious functionaries (Brahmins) in the society, undermining the belief in their miraculous powers and giving rise to doubts about the Brahmins' monopolistic right to serve as the sole and compulsory mediators between gods and humans.

Despite opposition, the new holy men, divine individuals and miracle workers have established a firm place for themselves in the contemporary Indian society and have become an influential factor in what Indian political scientists, sociologists and journalists call the "political culture."

To some degree, this problem is the result of changes in the balance of power between various strata of the Indian society and changes in the goals and outlook of these strata, stemming, in turn, from the socioeconomic changes of the years of the country's independent development. These changes have naturally affected methods and forms of political mobilization. In particular,

there have been perceptible changes in the traditional "voting banks," as they are generally called in India. During the first series of general elections after India won its independence (approximately until the end of the 1960's), landowners controlled the votes of the majority of renters, rural elders controlled the votes of the rural population, the caste council (or panchayat) controlled the votes of the caste or subcaste, and the traditional elite controlled the votes of the religious community.

According to Indian political analysts, a new and more complex mechanism for the mobilization of voter support has recently begun to take shape. The operation of this mechanism on the national scale with a view to the positions of the main classes and social strata can be analyzed productively only as a result of extensive comprehensive studies by specialists in various fields.

The subject of this article is just one, relatively limited aspect of this problem, namely the efforts of some of the leaders of neoreligious cults to involve (under their auspices) the most oppressed segments of the population, segments subject to the highest degree of social discrimination, in political activity--the former untouchables, who are now generally called harijans ("children of God"), farm laborers and members of tribes or ethnic groups whose socioeconomic development is quite retarded in comparison to most of the population. According to Indian terminology, these groups belong to the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes that enjoy certain constitutional privileges and make up around 52 percent of the population.

In spring 1978 the interest of the Indian public, which is accustomed to mass religious demonstrations, was aroused by a mahayagna (great sacrifice) near Ahmadabad (Gujarat). This was the site of a gathering of 200,000 people from the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan, the followers of a man known as Baba Jai Gurudev, a former policeman (named Tulsidas in secular life) who started the neoreligious movement "Jai Gurudev dharma pracharak sanstha" ("Society To Publicize the Beliefs of Jai Gurudev") in the mid-1950's. The great sacrifice was quite impressive. In all, 50,000 liters of milk and 32 tons of melted butter were poured into 64 sacrificial fires for 9 days to honor all of the gods of the Hindu pantheon. In addition, 50 tons of rice, sesame seeds and other products were burned in the flames.

The great sacrifice evoked various types of comments, including vehement protests against the senseless waste of scarce food products. One correspondent asked Jai Gurudev: "Is this not a waste of money, especially in a country as poor as India?" Baba replied: "Wait and see what blessings mankind will receive in the future." The organizers were also asked whether it would not have been better to use these resources to help the victims of the hurricane in Andhra Pradesh. They replied that the sacrifice would protect the entire world against hurricanes in the future.¹ The ritual cost 10 million rupees, a sum collected, according to the organizers, by the followers of Jai Gurudev. Besides this, the municipal corporation of Ahmadabad spent 100,000 rupees to supply the site of the ritual with electricity, water and sewerage.

A year after Jai Gurudev organized the great sacrifice, Mahant Jamunadas, the superior of a large ashram (shrine), known as a "local divine," organized a

10-day ritual in Jhabua District (Madhya Pradesh). This district, one of the most underdeveloped and destitute in the state, is inhabited primarily by members of the Bhil and Bhilal tribes, who are centuries behind the Indian average in their development. According to a witness, INDIAN EXPRESS correspondent N. K. Singh, the ritual cost the organizers 30 million rupees, and 210,000 rupees' worth of food burned in sacrificial fires. Besides this, almost half a million participants in the ritual had to be housed and fed. The ancient ritual was preceded by a completely modern advertisement in the local press, which also cost a great deal. The generous sacrifices "for the sake of the peace and happiness of mankind" against the background of the surrounding poverty, underdevelopment and ignorance motivated the correspondent to complain that "the expenditures exceeded all the bounds of senseless waste."³

Jai Gurudev's organization is one of the neoreligious movements. One of the bases for this categorization is the fact that it has been joined by members of different religions--Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Buddhists and Animists. In other words, this is one of the many attempts to establish a universal, supra-religious and therefore new faith.

In today's India sacrifices are commonplace. Just as in the old days, the flames of sacrificial fires attract tens and hundreds of thousands of people. These flames reflect a belief in miracles and the irrational dream of obtaining a better life in the quickest possible, supernatural and therefore illusory way. But something else is hidden behind the smoke of these fires. When the fires go out, only ashes and faith remain. Therefore, the fires are lit to keep faith from being extinguished and turning into ashes.

Urbanites, especially inhabitants of the capital, have grown accustomed to this kind of split [material/spiritual]. They participate in political affairs and generally do not mix politics with religion, with the exception of those who support religious communal parties and organizations. Their political sympathies are far from always identical to their general outlook. Orthodox religious functionaries can therefore play their traditional role among these people.

The social function and political role of the neoreligious cult leaders like Jai Gurudev and, to some extent, Mahant Jamunadas are different. They operate in more backward regions with a destitute and ignorant rural population, whose consciousness is still primarily religious. Informed observers believe that Jai Gurudev can influence a million and a half of the poorest peasants and members of the "lowest" castes (Ahirs, Kurms, Kears and others) in the most backward districts of eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, but "the influence of religious preachers declines perceptibly wherever the growing well-to-do peasantry takes an active part in politics."⁶ The process of the involvement of the poorest masses in politics as an independent force has only begun, and not in all regions. The process is becoming apparent or entering its initial stage on the farthest periphery of the Hindu community, where religion and politics interact in strange ways.

Jai Gurudev was lavish with prophecies and promises of miracles at the start of his career. For example, he predicted an imminent war between Pakistan and

India, during which "many atom bombs will be dropped on India. Under the influence of the united will of Indian spiritualists, however, 75 percent of the bombs will not explode. The rest will destroy only those who eat meat and drink wine." He predicted the collapse of the United Nations and the establishment of a new international organization with its headquarters in India, which would then become the center of the world.⁷ Gurudev also publicly promised to resurrect one of the leaders of the Indian liberation movement, Subhash Chandra Bose. "A man named Jai Gurudev," wrote B. T. Tripathi, a researcher of the saadhas (holy wanderers--B. K.), "caused a sensation in the country by predicting that Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose would appear in Kanpur on a specific date. They say that Jai Gurudev wanted to declare himself the Netaji but apparently lacked the courage to do so."⁸

Without waiting for his predictions to come true, Jai Gurudev decided to form his own political party. In April 1980 he called his followers to a gathering in Lucknow and told them that God had appeared to him on 23 March and had commanded him to found a political party. This was followed by the announcement of the founding of the Durdarshi Party (the "Party with an Eye on the Future"). The people at the gathering collected 200,000 rupees in cash, 30 kilograms of silver jewelry and 1 kilogram of gold jewelry for the needs of the party.

Jai Gurudev himself became the chairman of the party. He is solely responsible for the appointment of the vice chairmen and other officials. No elective administrative bodies are envisaged. All members are divided into two categories: namdan ("name-giving")--passive members who pay 1 rupee a year; sevadan ("service-giving")--activists who are obligated to organize undertakings, participate in all of them and pay annual membership fees of 10 rupees. The obligations of members of the Durdarshi Party are quite simple: In addition to swearing selfless devotion to their guru, observing a vegetarian diet and refraining from tobacco and alcohol, they must write the slogan "Jai Gurudev is the name of God! The age of truth is upon us!" on fences and buildings.

The party program is also simple. Its fundamental principle is set forth in the slogan "I will turn India into a paradise!" The social program consists in an appeal for the eradication of all differences between members of the Indian society, with the following meaningful stipulation--"with the exception of differences between the rich and the poor." As the party manifesto says, "Let the rich earn money and enjoy life, but conditions should also be better for the poor." This will require neither strikes nor working class organizations nor socioeconomic reforms. It is indicative that Jai Gurudev persistently advises workers and farm laborers to refrain from participating in strikes and union activity and becoming involved in other forms of struggle for their rights. All they have to do is write Gurudev's name on the nearest fence each day, pray and wait for the coming of the "Age of Truth," when, as Jai Gurudev promises, God will provide each with abundant jewels and other treasures, and when each bigha of land (0.25 hectares) will yield an unprecedented harvest of 100 maunds (around 4 quintals) of rice. For this reason, agrarian reforms are not needed either.

The Durdarshi Party manifesto also takes new developments into account. For example, it promises not only to "revive the faith in spiritualism" (the main thesis of all religious communal organizations), but also to "encourage the acquisition of material goods." It also contains demands for: the renunciation of the nationalization of any kind of property, the exemption of incomes of under 50,000 rupees a year from taxes, the cancellation of all peasant debts incurred prior to 1975 and so forth.¹⁰

Jai Gurudev has his own response to the problems of peasants and urban middle strata. One of these problems is the growing unemployment among university and college graduates. The unemployed young are responsible for a great deal of unrest, which often acquires destructive characteristics. At one press conference Gurudev said: "The destruction of national property during demonstrations by hundreds of thousands of unemployed and despondent young people could be avoided if all of them were to become saadhas."¹¹ But the prospect of becoming a destitute wandering holy man performing no useful job does not appeal to unemployed physicians, engineers, attorneys and journalists.

Jai Gurudev has displayed remarkable organizational ability. Witnesses speak of the truly military discipline and industriousness of his followers, who act with a speed and efficiency rarely seen in other political parties. Distinguished from the rest of the population by their red turbans and robes--the uniform of Gurudev's movement--the members of the Durdarshi Party are regarded as an impressive political force in Uttar Pradesh and neighboring states. After gaining the support of the poor and illiterate peasant and harijan masses, Gurudev established broad contacts with petty and middle merchants and businessmen, from among whom he recruits his closest assistants. The Durdarshi Party publishes five journals, including the English-language STRANDED INDIA. According to its leaders, the party has no shortage of funds, and this is a rarity in India.

During the first two decades after India won its independence, Christian missionaries had a virtual monopoly on work among backward tribes (known collectively as adivasi). At the constituent congress of the Vishva Hindu Parishad (1966, Allahabad), prestigious leaders of orthodox branches and currents of Hinduism criticized the Christian missionaries, who were, according to these leaders, filling a kind of religious-ideological vacuum among the adivasi, which had come into being in connection with the gradual disappearance of their centuries-old isolation from the surrounding population and with their involvement in economic affairs and in cultural and religious contacts as the tribal way of life disintegrated. For this reason, much was said at the congress about the need for Hindu missionary activity among the adivasi to "spread true Hinduism among mountain tribes and other backward groups." Doubts were expressed, however, as to whether the heads of Hindu temples and ashrams would allocate part of their accumulated wealth for the establishment of schools and hospitals in adivasi regions, as the Christian missionaries were doing. "It is clear," one report on the congress said, "that few Hindu organizations (if any) will be willing to meet the risks of malaria-ridden jungles even for the sake of helping diseased adivasis."¹⁶ This prediction, in contrast to many others, essentially came true.

The vacuum created in such cases is generally filled by enterprising neo-religious leaders who perform the social function of a transmission mechanism--from the traditional way of life and the equally traditional isolation to modern organization and policy. They are gradually redirecting the loyalties of the illiterate and ignorant adivasis under their influence for the political mobilization of supporters in their own interest.

In this connection, questions could be asked about the possible prospects of movements headed by neoreligious leaders. The answers will require a look at analogies from the recent past. In the 1920's--that is, during the colonial era--the Ad-Dharm (Old Faith) movement began in Punjab among the untouchable chamars (nomads). It was founded by Mangu Ram, a former activist in the Gadar national revolutionary party who had to emigrate to the United States under the threat of repression by the English colonial authorities. When Mangu Ram returned to India, he launched a campaign to organize the Punjabi untouchables under the slogan of qaumiyat (communal solidarity), mazheb (faith) and majlis (organization). Mangu Ram regarded the untouchables as the native population of the country--that is, "true sons of India"--and their faith as the true old Indian religion, in contrast to the later "Aryan" Hinduism. There was an inherent contradiction in this thesis. Mangu Ram did not preach any kind of pre-Vedic religious doctrines. He called himself a follower of the medieval Punjabi preacher Rav Das, a member of the Bhakti movement, which was opposed to Hinduism and Islam but had many philosophical points in common with these religions.

Ad-Dharm was a religious and social movement. At its height the movement had a million members. Distinguished from the rest of the population by their scarlet turbans and bright green neckscarves, the members of the movement ostentatiously violated the bans of Hindu castes: They washed in their ponds, drew water from their wells and entered their temples, which sometimes led to violent clashes. The Ad-Dharm leaders, however, felt that these forms of protest were not as important as efforts to educate the untouchables, improve their economic situation and raise their social status, and not by revolutionary means but within the existing socioeconomic system. For this reason, the emphasis in the movement gradually shifted from mass demonstrations to election campaigning for seats in local government and the provincial legislative assembly. In time, many of the leaders and activists of the movement entered the Indian National Congress. In the second half of the 1930's the Ad-Dharm movement merged with the general national liberation movement in which the oppressed masses of India had invested their hopes.

Neoreligious movements in independent India developed against a different economic, social and political background. Changes in the harijan and adivasi way of life, unrestricted by foreign authority, picked up speed and acquired an irreversible nature. These changes have not always made life easier for the poorest social strata. Inclusion in economic affairs intensifies the exploitation of harijans and adivasis, destroys their closed economy and leaves them to the mercy of spontaneous market forces. The disintegration of their customary way of life has been accompanied by the disappearance of seemingly immutable moral standards, division of labor patterns and forms and methods of contact. The life of the poorest strata is

being invaded by the laws and values of the unfamiliar outside world, and this is giving rise to confusion, fear and insecurity.

Clan elders and the traditional elite do not know the answers to new questions and are losing their previous influence and authority. But new people, who might be called neogurus, are taking their place. In contrast to professional politicians and officials who only visit outlying regions, the neogurus settle among the harijans and adivasis, speak their dialect and employ familiar concepts and images to promise them a better life in the near future. One of the neoguru's advantages is the centuries-old tradition of blind submission to the religious teacher (or guru), giving him complete control over the tan, men and dhan (body, soul and property) of the disciple.

The new leader also confers physical symbols of identification upon his followers--a pink turban (Gurudev) or a yellow cap and beads (Bastar Baba). This engenders a new sociopsychological frame of mind: "We"--the followers of the baba or guru, the true believers, as a result of which they immediately have a higher social status, acquire a defender of their interests in the person of the "miracle worker" or "divine individual," who is not only familiar with the outside world but also claims to control it; and "They"--everyone else, including members of the same tribe or caste, relegated to a lower social category. The extent of the stratification of tribal society on this basis is attested to by recorded cases of "bead-wearers" refusing to marry people who do not wear beads, and tribe members refusing to perform services for other members in accordance with the traditional system of division of labor.

The people who fall under the influence of these leaders perform altered, "new" rituals, participate in collective discussions of religious subjects, kneel before the guru to receive his blessing and have a sense of participation in the "miracles" he performs. But they are also involved in mass undertakings: from rituals to protest marches, from visits to the baba's ashram to mass civil disobedience on his orders. They vote for the candidates the guru supports, viewing this constitutionally guaranteed right as another form of submission to the guru. In this way, he becomes the primary link in the mechanism for the political mobilization of specific segments of the oppressed masses.

The administration and government agencies institute programs for a genuine rise in the harijan and adivasi standard of living, for their education and for participation by members of these strata in public administration and legislative bodies. In this context, the INC(I) government is the successor of movements like the Ad-Dharm and, what is most important, has inherited their democratic content. In contrast to these programs, the neogurus do not approach their followers with the light of knowledge or a sincere appeal for a constructive struggle for a new and happier life, but with beads, "miracles," superstitions and rituals. They do not raise their followers to the heights of knowledge and culture and do not tell them the real causes of their suffering and tribulations. They descend to their level to perpetuate it and to prevent the growth of class awareness at any cost. The neogurus cannot exist and prosper without the perpetuation of ignorance and obscurity, and for this reason the neoreligious movements of this type can promote only a conservative and reactionary policy or, more specifically, a religious communal policy.

There is also another distinction, but this one is to the credit of the neogurus. The effects of government programs still extend primarily to the small upper substratum of harijans and adivasis, whereas work with the masses is a guarantee of the success of the leaders of neoreligious movements. As soon as they win the trust of the masses, they seek and find contacts with politicians with the aid of the organization and votes of their followers. The neogurus invariably establish contact with parties opposing progressive and leftist ideas, and even liberal ideas about the modernization of Indian society, never forgetting to secure their own welfare. They are trying to become part of the elite, to acquire wealth and power as quickly as possible, leaving their followers nothing but meaningless illusions and futile hopes.

"All idealists," K. Marx and F. Engels wrote, "both philosophical and religious, both old and new, believe in inspiration, in revelations, in saviors, in miracle workers.... As soon as this idealistic nonsense has a pragmatic purpose, it immediately reveals its harmful nature: its priestly love of power, religious fanaticism, quackery, pious hypocrisy and devout fraudulence."²³ This definition is fully applicable to the leaders of the neoreligious movements in India today.

FOOTNOTES

1. ILLUSTRATED WEEKLY OF INDIA, 2 April 1978.
3. THE INDIAN EXPRESS, 13 May 1979.
6. THIS FORTNIGHT, 16 May 1980.
7. Ibid.; THE INDIAN EXPRESS, 29 June 1980.
8. B. T. Tripathi, "Sadhus of India. A Sociological View," Bombay, 1978, p 102.
9. INDIA TODAY, 1 May 1980.
10. THE HINDUSTAN TIMES, 2 April 1980.
11. THE TIMES OF INDIA, 5 February 1981.
16. THE HINDUSTAN TIMES, 3 May 1966; HINDU, 15 February 1966.
23. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 3, pp 536-537.

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INTERNATIONAL

ORIENTALISTS' WORKS PUBLISHED IN 1984, PLANNED FOR 1985

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 84 (signed to press 20 Nov 84) pp 115-117

[Article by O. K. Dreyer: "Main Editorial Board of Eastern Literature in 1985"]

[Text] The year of 1985 is the last year of the 11th Five-Year Plan and an important frontier in the development of Soviet Oriental studies; by that time several pertinent works on the current situation in Asian and African countries will be published, the publication of the most valuable Oriental texts from Soviet manuscript collections will be continued, and works on history, economics, culture, linguistics, literary criticism and other fields of Oriental studies will be issued. Works published at the end of 1984 include the following fundamental studies: "Istoriya Afriki v XIX-nachale XX v." [The History of Africa in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries], "Noveyshaya istoriya Yemena" [Contemporary History of Yemen] and "Traditsionnyye struktury i ekonomicheskii rost v Indii" [Traditional Structures and Economic Growth in India]; the books "Iranskaya revolyutsiya, SShA i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost'" [The Iranian Revolution, the United States and International Security] by S. L. Agayev and "Politika SShA v Indiyском okeane" [U.S. Policy in the Indian Ocean] by A. V. Krutskikh; a translation of selected works by Sun Yat-sen and others. A four-volume Sino-Russian dictionary will be published in full in late 1984 and early 1985.

In 1985 the Main Editorial Board intends to publish over 210 works in all fields of Oriental studies.

Works on the philosophical aspects of the social development of Eastern countries will include "Evolutsiya aziatskikh obshchestv. Sintez traditsionnogo i sovremennogo" [The Evolution of Asian Societies. A Synthesis of the Traditional and the Contemporary]. It will examine transitional socioeconomic, political and ideological structures and the synthesis of the local traditional culture with the culture imposed from outside, analyze models of capitalist evolution with examples from some Eastern countries and reveal their severe contradictions of the present stage.

The international situation, which has been aggravated by the actions of imperialist forces, with the United States in the lead, necessitates the energetic exposure of the activities of reactionary groups in various parts

of the world. The indissoluble connection between the two main objectives of the present day--the consolidation of peace on our planet and the socioeconomic development of former colonial and dependent peoples--is described in N. A. Gnevushev's book "Gonka vooruzheniy i problemy razvitiya osvobodivshikhsya stran" [The Arms Race and Problems in the Development of Newly Liberated Countries]. The negative effects of the arms race on all aspects of life in the newly liberated countries are examined in this work. The peaceful policy of the USSR and the socialist community countries is described in detail.

The USSR's consistent struggle for the security of the Asian continent, against the arms race and for disarmament and the Soviet Union's support of the nonaligned movement are analyzed in the collective work "Problemy mira i bezopasnosti v Azii i pozitsiya SSSR" [Problems of Peace and Security in Asia and the Position Taken by the USSR]. Many documented facts are cited to prove that U.S. policy is a factor destabilizing the situation in Asia.

Philosophical questions are the subject of several interesting works. M. L. Titarenko's book "Drevnekitayskiy filosof Mo Di, yego shkola a ucheniya" [Ancient Chinese Philosopher Mo Di, His School and His Teachings] is the first detailed Russian-language study of the views of the Moists, the chief rivals of ancient Confucianism. The anthology "Drevnekitayskaya filosofiya: epokha Khan'" [Ancient Chinese Philosophy: Han Era] contains translations of important excerpts from Chinese sociopolitical and philosophical manuscripts from the 3d century BC to the 3d century AD. The role of philosophical ideas in India in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, particularly in the development of the ideology of the national liberation movement, is described in I. P. Chelysheva's work "Eticheskiye idei v mirovozzrenii Vivekanandy, Tilaka, Gkhosha" [Ethics in the World View of Vivekananda, Tilak and Ghose]. M. P. Isayev's book "Sovremennyy revolyutsionnyy protsess v stranakh Indokitaya: problemy pererastaniya natsional'no-osvoboditel'nykh revolyutsiy v sotsialisticheskoye" [The Contemporary Revolutionary Process in the Countries of Indochina: The Evolution of National Liberation Revolutions into Socialist Ones] reveals the distinctive features of the popular democratic revolutions in South Vietnam and Laos in 1975 and in Cambodia in 1979. Special attention is given to the analysis of problems in the transition of economically underdeveloped countries of Indochina to socialism without going through the capitalist stage of development. In the work "Ofitsial'nyye ideologicheskiye doktriny Indonezii, Malayzii i Filippin" [Official Ideological Doctrines of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines], V. A. Zharov explains their ideological origins, lists their distinctive features and presents a discerning analysis of the methods of their establishment. One of the main social problems of the current stage of capitalist development in the newly liberated countries--the evolution of the bourgeoisie over the last 30 years--is discussed in "Burzhuaziya i sotsial'naya evolyutsiya stran zarubezhnogo Vostoka" [The Bourgeoisie and the Social Evolution of Foreign Eastern Countries], a collection of articles, on the basis of abundant documented information about many countries (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Turkey and others). Changes in the social structure of these countries, the bourgeoisie's connections with the government bureaucracy and transnational corporations and other topics are also discussed in the work.

The works on the current stage of the national liberation movement include N. M. Zotov's "Angola. Bor'ba prodolzhayetsya (ot natsional'nogo fronta k avangardnoy partii)" [Angola. The Struggle Continues (From the National Front to the Vanguard Party)].

Considerable importance is attached to the publication of works on religious and atheism: Ye. A. Doroshenko's "Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo v sovremennom Irane" [The Shiite Clergy in Today's Iran], "Induizm—traditsii i sovremennost'" [Hinduism—Tradition and the Present Day] and "Islam: problemy ideologii, prava, politiki i ekonomiki" [Islam: Ideological, Legal, Political and Economic Issues]. The latest edition of the almanac "Religii mira: istoriya i sovremennost'" [World Religions: History and the Present Day] contains scientific articles elucidating the philosophical concepts of Christianity and Buddhism, reports on the religious situation in several Asian countries and its influence on policy in these states, and surveys of atheistic literature. The book "Filosofiya i religiya na zarubezhnom Vostoke. XX vek" [Philosophy and Religion in the Foreign East. 20th Century] analyzes the present state of the religious consciousness in the regions where Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism are widespread and demonstrates the interaction of philosophy and religion in Eastern tradition. This is the first general survey of the connection between philosophy and religion in the foreign East in the 20th century from a Marxist vantage point.

New editions in the "History of the African Countries" series warrant attention: the collective work "Istoriya Gany v novoye i noveysheye vremya" [The Modern and Contemporary History of Ghana], the book "Istoriya Tanzanii v novoye i noveysheye vremya" [Modern and Contemporary History of Tanzania] by V. Ye. Ovchinnikov and the book "Istoriya Kenii v novoye i noveysheye vremya" [Modern and Contemporary History of Kenya] by I. I. Filatova.

The history of Far Eastern countries is the subject of the books "Diplomatiya srednevekovogo Kitaya" [Medieval Chinese Diplomacy] by S. N. Goncharov, "Revolutsiya 1925-1927 gg. v Kitaye. Problemy i otsenka" [The Revolution of 1925-1927 in China. Problems and Appraisals] by L. P. Delyusin and A. S. Kostyayeva, "Neokolonializm SSHA i Yuzhnaya Koreya" [U.S. Neocolonialism and South Korea] by A. A. Proshin and A. A. Timonin and "Vneshnyaya politika Yaponii v 70-nachale 80-kh godov: teoriya i praktika" [Japanese Foreign Policy in the 1970's and Early 1980's: Theory and Practice] by R. Sh.-A. Aliyev.

Almanacs continue to be published—"Kitayskaya Narodnaya Respublika v 1983 godu: politika, ekonomika, ideologiya" [The People's Republic of China in 1983: Politics, Economics, Ideology], "Indiya 1984" [India 1984] and "Yaponiya 1984" [Japan 1984]; they contain articles on the most pertinent aspects of domestic and foreign policy, economics, culture and public life.

The works on the economic affairs of Afro-Asian countries include A. V. Bereznaya's "Transnatsional'nyye korporatsii na rynkakh razvivayushchikhsya stran" [Transnational Corporations in the Markets of Developing Countries], V. A. Gantskiy's "Razvivayushchiyesya strany Azii v mirovom kapitalisticheskom syr'yevom khozyaystve" [The Developing Asian Countries in the World Capitalist Resource Economy], L. Z. Zevin's "Strany razlichnogo urovnya razvitiya v

mirovom khozyaystve: problemy ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy" [Countries with Varying Levels of Development in the World Economy: Problems in Economic Relations], M. F. Gataullin's "Agrarnyye reformy i klassovaya bor'ba v Yegipte (konets 40-nachalo 80-kh godov)" [Agrarian Reform and the Class Struggle in Egypt (Late 1940's to Early 1980's)] and E. G. Arasly's "Mezharabskiye ekonomicheskiye otnosheniya" [Inter-Arab Economic Relations].

A work by researchers from seven socialist countries, "Strany SEV i razvivayushchiyesya strany: 80-ye gody" [The CEMA Countries and the Developing Countries: The 1980's], analyzes the program of action to improve international economic relations discussed by K. U. Chernenko at a reception honoring the participants in the summit-level CEMA economic conference on 14 June 1984.

"Sovetskoye vostokovedeniye v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Soviet Oriental Studies During the Years of the Great Patriotic War], a book written by participants and witnesses, will be published to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. It will contain articles by Oriental scholars who served in the Soviet Army in the Far East and took part in defeating militarist Japan and documents and papers on the Oriental scholars who were in Leningrad during the blockade and who were able to save items of inestimable cultural value and perform a great deal of scientific and educational work and on the activities of scholars in scientific and academic centers in Moscow, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. The compilers and authors have dedicated this book to the Soviet Oriental scholars who died during the war years.

Another book of interest is the anthology "Za mir na zemle Korei" [For Peace on the Korean Land] on the USSR struggle of 1950-1953 to stop the U.S. aggression against the DPRK and on the colossal Soviet assistance in the restoration of the DPRK national economy.

Several works deal with the Pacific countries: V. P. Nikolayev's "Politicheskiye sistemy osvobodivshikhsya stran Okeanii" [The Political Systems of Newly Liberated Countries in Oceania], I. M. Meliksetova's "Tribalizm i gosudarstvennost': etnonatsional'nyye i sotsial'no-politicheskiye protsessy v Papua-Novoy Gvineye v 60-80-ye gody XX v." [Tribalism and Government: Ethnic and Sociopolitical Processes in Papua-New Guinea in the 1960's-1980's] and others.

Works on the ancient East include M. A. Dandamayev's "Politicheskaya istoriya Akhemenidskoy derzhavy" [The Political History of the Achaemenid Empire] and M. B. Piotrovskiy's "Yuzhnaya Araviya v ranneye srednevekov'ye: skladivaniye srednevekovogo obshchestva" [South Arabia in the Early Middle Ages: The Establishment of the Medieval Society].

More works are being published in the series of ancient Oriental texts: the early feudal Japanese law code "Taihoryo" in two volumes, a translation of the fifth-century Chinese work "Bai yu jing" ("The Sutra of the 100 Parables") and others.

More books will be published on Afro-Asian culture. Some of these are "Afrika: kul'turnoye nasledie i sovremennost'" [Africa: Cultural Heritage and the Present Day], "Chelovek i mir v yaponskoy kul'ture" [Man and the World in Japanese Culture] and "Yaponiya: kul'tura i obshchestvo v epokhu nauchno-tekhnicheskoy revolyutsii" [Japan: Culture and Society in the Era of Technological Revolution].

Works on linguistics will include the reference work "Zarubezhnyy Vostok: yazykovaya situatsiya i yazykovaya politika" [The Foreign East: The Linguistic Situation and Linguistic Policy], works on the Tangut and Mongolian languages and the unique papers of the Soviet-Vietnamese linguistic expedition in the SRV.

Literary studies will be represented by monographs--L. A. Aganina's "Chelovek, obshchestvo, religiya v sovremennoy nepal'skoy poezii" [Man, Society and Religion in Contemporary Nepalese Poetry] and V. N. Kirpichenko's "Sovremennaya yegipetskaya proza: 60-70-ye gody" [Contemporary Egyptian Prose: 1960's-1970's]--and by important collective studies--"Rabindranat Tagor: Zhizn' i tvorchestvo" [Rabindranath Tagore: Life and Works] and "Khudozhestvennyye traditsii literatur Vostoka i sovremennost'" [The Artistic Traditions of Eastern Literatures and the Present Day]--on early and current forms of traditionalism.

The following books are to be published as part of the series "Eastern Writers and Scholars": Ye. A. Zapatova's book on the Burmese educator Pi Mou Nin, V. V. Malyavin's "Chzhuan-tszy" [Zhuang-zi]--on the outstanding Chinese thinker of the 4th-3d centuries BC, Z. N. Petrunicheva's "Guruzada Anparao"--on the outstanding Indian writer, and Ye. P. Chelyshev's "Sumitranandan Pant"--on the renowned Indian poet.

Several reference works have been prepared for publication--"Afrika v tsifrakh" [African Statistics], "Demokraticeskaya Respublika Madagaskar" [The Democratic Republic of Madagascar], "Liviya" [Libya], "Mongol'skaya Narodnaya Respublika" [The Mongolian People's Republic], "Respublika Zimbabve" [Republic of Zimbabwe] and others.

More books will be published in the series "Accounts of Eastern Countries"; books on the countries of the Maghreb, Nepal, the countries of West Africa, New Guinea and others are to be published.

The latest English-language edition of "Afrika v sovetskikh issledovaniyakh. 1985" [Africa in Soviet Studies. 1985] will be published.

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INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCE ON AUSTRALIA, OCEANIA AT EASTERN STUDIES INSTITUTE

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 84 (signed to press 20 Nov 84) pp 132-134

[Report on 15th Scientific Conference on Australia and Oceania in Moscow on 24-25 May]

[Text] The 15th Scientific Conference on Australia and Oceania was held on 24-25 May 1984. The program included 33 reports and speeches. The conference was attended by scholars from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Rostov-on-Don, Tbilisi and Yerevan.

After calling the conference to order, Professor K. V. Malakhovskiy, head of the Pacific Affairs Department of the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, described the results of studies of southern Pacific countries. During the period between the 14th and 15th conferences, he said, collective general studies had been published, "Tikhookeanskiy regionalizm: kontseptsii i real'nost'" [Pacific Regionalism: Theory and Reality] and "Nezavisimyye gosudarstva Okeanii" [Independent States of Oceania], as well as the monographs "Abstraliya i Kitay. Istoriya razvitiya otnosheniy" [Australia and China. The History of Their Relations] by P. M. Ivanov and "Etnicheskaya situatsiya v Okeanii" [The Ethnic Situation in Oceania] by P. I. Puchkov. The anthology "Aktual'nyye problemy razvitiya Avstralii i Okeanii" [Current Problems in the Development of Australia and Oceania] and articles on current aspects of the political, socioeconomic and cultural development of the countries of this region were also published. Several studies are being prepared for publication by the Nauka Publishing House, particularly the anthology "Novyye tendentsii vo vnutrennem razvitii i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh stran tikhookeanskogo basseyna" [New Trends in the Internal Development and International Relations of Pacific Countries], the books--N. A. Butinov's "Sovremennaya organizatsiya polineziytsev" [Contemporary Polynesian Organizational Patterns], I. M. Meliksetova's "Tribalizm i gosudarstvennost'" [Tribalism and Government] and A. Yu. Suchkov's "Syr'yevyye resursy i regional'nyye svyazi tikhookeanskikh stran" [Crude Resources and Pacific Regional Relations], and the extensive "Bibliografiya Avstralii" [Australia Bibliography], compiled by Ye. V. Govor.

Various sociopolitical, economic, historical, literary and ethnological issues were discussed at the conference. Economic problems were the subject of several reports. N. V. Gordeyeva (Moscow)--"Australia's Commercial and

Economic Relations with Developing Countries"--noted the expansion of Australian trade with these countries. In his report, "Who Controls Australian Corporations?" B. B. Rubtsov (Moscow) discussed the bourgeois ideas of "separating ownership from control," "the rotation of managers" and forms of merging the capital of industrial and financial companies and reveals the specific features of methods of analyzing monopolistic groups in Australia. M. M. Solodkina (Moscow) said in her report "On the Categorization of Australian Capitalism" that the migrant form of Australian capitalism is distinguished by "American" patterns in agriculture, a reformist variety of capitalism in which the state is the stabilizing force in social-class conflicts, and the declaration of the slogan of "white Australia" as a solution to ethnic problems.

A. Yu. Suchkov (Moscow) examined the economic structure in his report on "Problems in the Establishment of a Regional Raw Material Industry" and divided it into two subsystems: One encompasses raw material transactions among developed capitalist countries in the region, and the other encompasses transactions between developed capitalist and developing states in the Pacific. He spoke at length on Australia, its place in the system of regional economic relations and the distinctive features of the development of Australian capitalism. A. V. Chuyko (Moscow) said in his report on "Agriculture's Place in the New Zealand Economy" that New Zealand is one of the few developed capitalist countries with an economy based on agriculture. Agricultural products accounted for more than 60 percent of all exports at the beginning of the 1980's. Animal husbandry is still the leading sector.

Sociopolitical issues were discussed in several reports. E. I. Razzakova (Moscow)--"The Social Stratification of the Native Australian Population at the Present Time"--noted that the federal government is now playing an important role in the formation of a native Australian "elite," a process which began after World War II. The dominant class has an incentive to strengthen this Aboriginal social stratum because the government hopes to use it as a promoter of its own interests. L. G. Stefanchuk (Moscow)--"The Political-Organizational Structure of the National and Labor Parties in New Zealand"--discussed these parties' similarities and differences. In her report on "The Political Situation in New Caledonia (1980-1983)," N. P. Chelintseva (Moscow) noted that New Caledonia occupies a special place in the national liberation struggle of the population of French territories because of its complex socioethnic structure, primarily in connection with the presence of a large European population. One of the most vital issues of the present day is the substantial and constantly growing gap between the European and Melanesian standards of living. The main difficulty in the internal political development of the territory is the exacerbation of relations between the Melanesian population, with its desire for independence, and the Europeans and Polynesians, who oppose this movement.

A report on "The Countries of Oceania in World Politics" was presented by I. O. Chukanov (Moscow). Relations between the insular states of Oceania, he stressed, have certain distinctive historical, political, economic and ethnic features. In spite of some disagreements, the Pacific countries have taken a united stand on a number of important regional and international

issues. Australia and New Zealand, which still constitute the most influential force in the region, are using their influence to prevent the development of contacts between insular states and the USSR and other socialist countries. The United States is paying more attention to these countries now that Washington wants to acquire new military bases in the region. China has proposed various forms of cooperation to the states of Oceania in the hope of strengthening its own position there. Contacts between ASEAN countries and the countries of Oceania are being developed.

Various aspects of the history of the southern Pacific countries were the subject of several reports. P. M. Ivanov (Moscow)--"Australian Sinology Today"--described the 1970's as a period when the study of China became a major field of Orientology in Australia. Chinese affairs are now being studied in the Center on Contemporary China at the Australian National University in Canberra, which coordinates the activities of all Sinologists in the country. Sinology is also being developed at other universities. Research is being conducted in various fields: ancient history, rural China, industrial economics and policy, domestic policy, foreign trade, the Taiwan situation and the problems of Australian huaqiao. In a report on "'White Australia' and the Working Class (An Inquiry into Historical Studies of This Issue)," G. I. Kanevskaya (Vladivostok) analyzed the debates of the 1950's by Australian historians on the origins of the "White Australia" policy at the end of the 19th century and the working class' role in its establishment. Bourgeois and reformist authors tried to camouflage the racist essence of this policy by calling it a result of economic factors: the desire of the Australian working class to prevent competition from the cheap labor of "colored" immigrants. Entering the debates from a Marxist standpoint, V. Bergman proved that the "White Australia" policy was in the interests of the dominant class and that the working class did not support it because this policy was consistent with the workers' actual wishes, but because it was influenced by bourgeois ideology under the conditions of the prevailing reformism in the Australian labor movement at that time. I. V. Kovler (Moscow) said in her report on "The Main Domestic and Foreign Policy Aims of the National Party of New Zealand in 1949-1957" that the conservative leaders of New Zealand were trying to portray conservatism as a nationwide movement, representing the interests of all social strata. Despite the fact that relations with Great Britain as a mother country were still the prevailing tendency during those years, a process of convergence with the United States began. Anticommunism became the chief motive of National Party activity. In 1957 the party was defeated in the parliamentary elections for several reasons: the deterioration of economic conditions in world markets in the late 1950's, the drop in raw material prices, the decline of the standard of living in the country and a rift within the party itself. The Labor Party took over. A. Ya. Massov (Leningrad) examined fascist Germany's claims to the Trust Territory of New Guinea, one of its earlier colonies, and the reaction of Australian ruling circles to these claims in a report on "The Australian Colonies at the Beginning of World War II." N. S. Skorobogatykh (Moscow)--"The Study of Australian History in Russia in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries"--analyzed the causes of the Russian public's interest in this country. Ye. S. Soboleva (Leningrad) reported on "The 1912 Rebellion in Portuguese Timor." A. O. Tamazishvili (Moscow) discussed the study of

Australia and Oceania in the Pacific Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1942-1950).

Reports were also presented by: V. I. Belikov (Moscow)--"The Linguistic Situation in Australia," I. V. Golovnya (Moscow)--"The Australian Drama in the First Half of the 20th Century," O. V. Zernetskaya (Kiev)--"Criticism of the Americanization of Australian Society in Minor Australian Prose," V. I. Kotlyarova (Rostov-on-Don)--"J. Mulgan's Novel 'The Solitary Man'," N. G. Nanitashvili (Tbilisi)--"The Structural Features of the Stories of F. Sargeson" and A. S. Petrikovskaya (Moscow)--"World War II and the Australian Novel."

Several reports dealt with questions of ethnology: L. A. Abramyan (Yerevan)--"An Inquiry into the Arnhem Land Customs of the Mirriri," O. Yu. Artemova (Moscow)--"The Wise Men and Sorcerers of the Australian Aborigines," M. S. Butinova (Leningrad)--"The Religious Situation in Present-Day Oceania," N. A. Butinov (Leningrad)--"The Restoration of Traditional Cultures in the Countries of Oceania," Ye. V. Govor (Moscow)--"Forgotten Sources on the Ethnology of the Australian and Tasmanian Aborigines," A. D. Dridzo (Leningrad)--"From the History of Soviet Studies of Oceania," V. F. Kabo (Moscow)--"New Life for an Ancient Culture," K. Yu. Meshkov (Moscow)--"Various Methods of Reaching a State of Ecstasy (As Illustrated by the Polynesian Experience)," A. M. Reshetov (Leningrad)--"The Malay--The Polynesian Peoples of China," D. D. Tumarkin (Moscow)--"The History of the Place Name Maklaya" and I. K. Fedorova (Leningrad)--"Early Polynesian Polytheistic Beliefs."

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INTERNATIONAL

EXHIBIT OF SOVIET, FOREIGN WORKS ON ISLAM

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 84 (signed to press 20 Nov 84) pp 135-136

[Report on information exhibit in State Public History Library of the RSFSR on 30 May]

[Text] An informational exhibit entitled "Soviet and Foreign Historians on Current Aspects of Islam in Asian and African Countries" and made up of more than 250 books and articles published in 1980-1984 was held in the Department of Asian and African History on 30 May 1984.

Works by the founders of Marxism-Leninism occupied a prominent place in the display. Anthologies and general works included "Zarubezhnyy Vostok: religioznyye traditsii i sovremennost'" [The Foreign East: Religious Traditions and the Present Day], Moscow, 1983; "Islam v stranakh Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka" [Islam in the Countries of the Near and Middle East], Moscow, 1982; "Religion, culture et politique en Afrique Noire" by M. A. Glete, Paris, 1981; and others.

The exhibit included works by Soviet historians on the methodology of the analysis and criticism of Islamic theories and works analyzing various aspects of Islam's influence in the socioeconomic life of Muslim countries. Studies of traditional and new topics pertaining to Islam aroused considerable interest ("The Islamic Economy," "Islamic Socialism," "The Islamic State" and others).

The role of Islam in the politics of each country and each region has distinctive features stemming from the level of maturity of the class consciousness of the laboring public and from the alignment of political forces. This theme was specifically reflected in the following works: S. L. Agayev, "Iran v proshlom i nastoyashchem (puti i formy revolyutsionnogo protsessa)" [Iran in the Past and Present (Directions and Forms of the Revolutionary Process)], Moscow, 1981; R. P. Kondakchan, "Turtsiya. Vnutrennyaya politika i islam" [Turkey. Domestic Policy and Islam], Yerevan, 1983; P. Crone, "Slaves on Horses. The Evolution of the Islamic Policy," London, 1980; "Islam in the Political Process," Cambridge, 1983; "Religion and Politics in Iran," London, 1983. The Iranian revolution is the subject of works by I. L. Andreyev, Ye. A. Doroshenko, I. M. Klyamkin and others.

Regional characteristics of the foreign policy of Near and Middle Eastern and African countries are discussed in the following works: "Vneshnyaya politika razvivayushchikhsya stran. Obshchiye problemy i metodologiya issledovaniya" [The Foreign Policy of Developing Countries. General Issues and Research Methods], Moscow, 1983; A. Hourani, "Europe and the Middle East," London, 1980.

The section on Islam's influence in science and culture aroused the interest of specialists. The exhibit included a special section of reference works and bibliographies.

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INTERNATIONAL

INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 84 (signed to press 20 Nov 84) pp 139-140

[Report by N. V. Vinogradova on Eighth International Seminar on Problems of Developing Countries in Varna from 28 May to 12 June]

[Text] The seminar regularly (every other year) conducted by the Institute of International Relations and Socialist Integration of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in conjunction with the academy presidium was held in Varna (Bulgaria) from 28 May to 12 June 1984. It was attended by scholars from 25 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. The socialist states were represented by scholars from Hungary, Bulgaria, the GDR, the SRV, the USSR and the CSSR.

The seminar was held to discuss a pertinent topic--"Structural Changes in the Economic and Foreign Economic Relations of Developing Countries." The program included dozens of reports, which served as the basis for further discussion, and three roundtable discussions by scholars from socialist and developing countries.

The supervisor of the seminar, S. Savov (Bulgaria), presented a welcoming speech. In a report on "Socioeconomic Orientation and Structural Changes in the Economies of Developing Countries," P. Petkov (Bulgaria) used countries choosing capitalist and non-capitalist patterns of development as examples to illustrate the distinctive features of the economic development of newly liberated states. He concentrated on the characteristic conditions of the development of their national economic structure, the role of the public, private and mixed sectors in the implementation of development strategy and the influence of socioeconomic orientation on structural changes in the economies of developing countries. A. Aguilar (Mexico) presented a report on "Crisis and Strategy of Development in Latin America."

Seminar participants focused their attention on the role of internal sources of accumulation in the economic development of newly liberated countries, questions of foreign financing and the role of the domestic and foreign markets in the establishment of the national economy. These topics were discussed in reports by W. Schmidt (GDR), S. Savov and V. A. Yashkin (USSR). In her report on "Accumulation in the Developing Countries: Scales and Problems," W. Schmidt analyzed the material prerequisites and contradictions

of expanded capitalist reproduction and described sources of accumulation and their use. S. Savov presented two reports: "Structural Changes in the Economies of Developing Countries" and "The Role of the Market in the Formation of the National Economic Structure in Developing Countries," in which he examined a broad range of general analytical matters and summarized a vast body of statistics on the state of various spheres of the economy in the newly liberated countries. He spoke at length on the effects of the urbanization process on market formation and development. V. A. Yashkin elucidated questions of foreign financing and its relationship to problems in structural reorganization in the economies of developing countries. He cited data on the flow of capital, export and import dynamics and the foreign debt of newly liberated states.

A. I. Chekhutov (USSR) presented a report on "Economic Cooperation by Socialist and Developing Countries," describing the characteristics of the current approach to this matter, revealing the basic features of economic cooperation and listing the prerequisites for its further expansion. The speaker presented a qualitative and quantitative description of the economic assistance developing countries receive from socialist states.

G. Kis (Hungary) discussed "Problems in Overcoming the Difficulties in the Agrarian Sector of Developing Countries," describing the present state of agriculture in the newly liberated states, listing the causes of agricultural underdevelopment and suggesting possible ways of surmounting it. She also discussed the planning of an economic development strategy envisaging the comprehensive resolution of agrarian problems.

Aspects of industrialization, particularly the criteria used in choosing an effective industrial structure in the developing countries, were the subject of I. Angelov's (Bulgaria) report. In his report on "The Socioeconomic Development of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Economic Cooperation with Developing Countries," N. Tsarevskiy (Bulgaria) discussed the prospects for Bulgarian economic relations with developing countries. He spoke at length on new promising forms of bilateral cooperation, particularly the establishment of joint societies on the territory of newly liberated states.

The seminar included three roundtable discussions on "The Role of the Least Developed Countries in the World Economy," "The Cooperative Movement in the Development of Agriculture in Newly Liberated Countries" and "Heightening the Impact of Cooperation by Socialist and Developing States."

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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK ON THEORIES OF THIRD WORLD LAGGING DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 84 (signed to press 20 Nov 84) pp 141-166

[Discussion of book "Nemarksistskaya politekonomiya o problemakh ostalosti i zavisimosti v razvivayushchemsya mire" [Non-Marxist Political Economy on the Problems of Underdevelopment and Dependence in the Developing World] by B. I. Slavnyy, Moscow, Glav. red. vost. lit-ry izd-va "Nauka," 1982, 248 pages; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Excerpts] B. I. Slavnyy's new book, a discerning analysis of non-Marxist theories of economic and social development in newly liberated countries, is, according to specialists, of an investigative nature. The analysis of theories connected with the effects of population growth on national production in the Eastern countries occupies a special place in the work. The originality of several of the author's approaches to his subject matter has aroused the interest of Orientalists. With a view to this, the editors have decided to publish some of the replies the magazine has received to questions raised in B. I. Slavnyy's book. Obviously, in view of the multifaceted nature of B. I. Slavnyy's work and the debatable aspects of some of the issues he raises, the remarks published below do not represent all of the possible opinions and views on this matter.

N. A. LIDLEYN (IMEMO [Institute of World Economics and International Relations], USSR Academy of Sciences) **NON-MARXIST POLITICAL ECONOMY: IN SEARCH OF A NEW PARADIGM.** We could say without exaggeration that B. I. Slavnyy's book is a noteworthy development in the Marxist criticism of non-Marxist theories of socioeconomic development in newly liberated countries. This is a thorough and highly analytical study. The book is of interest for many reasons.

First of all, the author proposes an original method of analysis. B. I. Slavnyy rejects the traditional method now prevailing in critical research. He does not try to "attach" the theory to the sociohistorical context in which it originated or to verify theoretical premises by comparing them to

the realities of developing countries. The main purpose of his study consisted in first revealing the internal logic of the establishment of non-Marxist political economy and its methodological continuity in various stages of its development, demonstrating its inherent conservatism, proving the universal applicability of its central ideas and setting aside transitory features to disclose the basic changes in its general analytical paradigm. To perform this task, B. I. Slavnyy, in his own words, used years of experience in the investigation of this topic as a basis for the disclosure of some universal logical connections making up the conceptual backbone of these theories and present in all stages of the evolution of non-Marxist political economy. In his analysis of changes in the interpretation of these logical relationships, the author constructs an analytical framework for the process of perception reflected in bourgeois and other non-Marxist theories and examines theories of underdevelopment and dependence as a gradually changing phenomenon. The correlation of labor, capital and land resources plays the deciding role in this procedure.

Secondly, B. I. Slavnyy's work is of interest because he analyzes precisely the fields of non-Marxist social studies that have been analyzed least in Soviet academic literature. This applies above all to theories of dependence. The author took on the difficult task of analyzing the voluminous and extremely confused works of theorists of the French-speaking branch of the "peripheral" school--A. Emanuel's theory of "non-equivalent exchange," S. Amin's theory of "worldwide accumulation" and S. Michalet and F. Aydalot's theories of world economics.

Finally, the third and most important reason is that the author attempts to formulate his own positive analytical approach to many important issues in the developing world on the basis of his criticism of these theories. Although this approach, which is still somewhat abstract and contradictory and, of course, debatable, probably could not be called a theory yet (the author has actually formulated a set of basic methodological principles or premises which do not make up an integral model to explain the functioning of the object of research), it allows the author to voice bold and unbiased opinions and provide original interpretations of traditions, underdevelopment and dependence. Belief in the priority of the demographic factor lies at the basis of B. I. Slavnyy's methodological approach.

The political economy of growth blames underdevelopment on the shortage of physical resources (especially capital) and the immaturity of the modern economic sector in the developing countries. The sociological branch of bourgeois political economy associates this phenomenon with the retarded social institutions of the traditional society, the inadequate influence of modern production on these institutions and the opposition of social strata with privileges inherited from pre-capitalist societies. The author sees the common principal weakness of these two positions in the tendency of both approaches to view economic and social aspects of development separately and to interpret the demographic factor as an exogenous variable that merely adds to the general difficulties of young states. B. I. Slavnyy stresses that only the dialectically interrelated analysis of economic, social and demographic conditions of social development can reveal the true nature of underdevelopment and dependence. He recommends that analysis focus on the problem

of overpopulation, which is essentially of a traditional nature, and concentrate on the effects of the demographic situation on the economic and social structure in developing countries. This approach causes the author to put special emphasis on the role of demography in the analysis of domestic problems in developing countries.

B. I. Slavnyy remarks that the significance of the factor of overpopulation is crossing national boundaries and acquiring global characteristics. This factor plays an exceptionally important role in the explanation of dependence as well as the phenomenon of underdevelopment. Overpopulation in developing countries affects the structure of international capitalist division of labor, the movement of capital and the very process of capital accumulation on the global scale. In turn, demographic and social processes in newly liberated countries are influenced by the world capitalist system.

B. I. Slavnyy expresses the interesting opinion that the world capitalist system has been forced by objective conditions to maintain the existence of population strata outside the orbit of capitalist exploitation in the developing countries. By shipping food to the most densely populated countries which are incapable of feeding themselves, the industrial capitalist states are actually participating in the reproduction of the human factor in the Afro-Asian world. This is one of the ways in which the world capitalist system maintains the economic basis of the traditional overpopulation. Furthermore, the failure to perform this function under the conditions of overpopulation in the developing world could lead to serious political and social clashes for the world capitalist system. This applies to its centers as well as its periphery. This, B. I. Slavnyy believes, is an important aspect of the idea of the "asymmetrical interdependence" of the two parts of the world capitalist economy.

Pre-capitalist overpopulation also has an adverse effect on the newly liberated states' market positions. It precludes modern capital-intensive production. Since market assessments of live labor in comparison to other production factors (capital) reflect the actual state of the national market and take pre-capitalist overpopulation into account, they do not coincide with world market assessments. The growth of overpopulation is accompanied by the constant growth of the market assessment of any type of resource (capital or land) in relation to live labor. Since income from rent entails less risk than business profits under these conditions, the free development of market relations is more likely to regenerate monetarized neo-feudalism than to accelerate the establishment of capitalism. This is why states have to restrict the freedom of the market and regulate the distribution of labor resources in later stages of capitalist development. These are also the reasons for the absence of spontaneous development and for the dependence of development on the state and on outside forces.

The discrepancy between conditions for the expanded reproduction of capital and manpower within the world capitalist economy lies at the basis, according to B. I. Slavnyy, of the phenomenon of underdevelopment and dependence. This discrepancy essentially consists in the fact that many capital resources imported by developing countries correspond to the current stage of the technological revolution in terms of their technological level (this is one of

the main reasons for the technological specialization of peripheral territories in the worldwide system of capitalist division of labor), while the expanded reproduction of labor resources is conducted on a traditional basis. The economic, social and cultural conditions corresponding to this basis limit possibilities for the inclusion of the surplus population in the modern production process. This is the reason for the discrepancy between conditions for the expanded reproduction of labor resources and the physical conditions of modern production.

Population growth combined with a modern sector incapable of providing employment for surplus manpower and influencing processes in the traditional sector can severely limit the results of economic growth strategy. All of this creates additional difficulties in the spread of modern forms of economic, social and demographic behavior. The powerful dynamics of demographic processes enlarge the social strata excluded from the process of socially useful labor. This results in social friction and increased social, religious, ethnic, tribal and other conflicts. In addition, there are the conflicts stemming directly from the capitalist nature of the modernization of developing societies.

The quantitative growth of strata having no relationship to the economic growth sector is accompanied--often on the most reactionary political and ideological basis--by their organizational and ideological consolidation. These strata are making more insistent demands on the state for the redistribution of part of national income in their favor. This eventually compounds social friction, makes businessmen insecure and creates serious difficulties in the implementation of the policy of satisfying basic needs, a policy which was announced in the United Nations and adopted by many developing countries and which presupposes the redistribution of the extremely limited existing supply of resources among larger numbers of people.

In general terms, these are the theoretical premises put forth by the author of this book.

In addition to being original and innovative, B. I. Slavnyy's approach also has some debatable features. This applies above all to the very idea of the priority of the demographic factor, which the author carries to extremes. The demographic factor does not cease to play the role of an absolute imperative even after it has been included in world market analysis, because, according to the author, the effects of overpopulation can be surmounted only through the fundamental redistribution of production factors within the world capitalist economy, and industrial capitalist states are not willing to take this step. This kind of strong emphasis on the role of the demographic factor necessarily diminishes the significance of other, equally important aspects of development and leads to the conclusion that newly liberated countries have reached an impasse in their evolution. But we can hardly agree with this. Another conclusion suggested by the author's method of analysis essentially acknowledges the impossibility of the complete capitalization of Eastern economies, which puts the very idea of the "transitional status" of young states in question. It appears that the great importance the author attaches to population dynamics is connected with his overestimation of the role of traditionalism in the development of the demographic situation in newly liberated countries and his underestimation of the influence of external factors

and modern forms of societal life. It is a well-known fact, however, that it was precisely these factors that were an important cause of the acceleration of population growth in young states. For example, there was the role played by the spread of modern methods of hygiene and medicine in the reduction of infant mortality. However, the role of external factors in the formation of the demographic situation in developing countries is quite contradictory--they can promote or inhibit population growth.

We also cannot agree with the author's de facto inclusion of the developing countries in the world capitalist system as well as the world capitalist economy. He has committed some errors in defining the place of these theories in non-Marxist social sciences and in the assessment of their practical value.

The author can also be criticized for making some statements that are not sufficiently clear and specific. This leaves the text open to different interpretations. For example, it is not quite clear what the author means when he speaks of market assessments of the value of manpower. Can there be any serious discussion of the spontaneous market mechanism in the young states, where market relations are still in the formative stage, where there is usually no single labor market and where institutional factors have traditionally played a colossal role in the determination of the value of manpower? The same kinds of questions could be asked about his discussion of the spontaneous transfer of resources.

We also have serious objections to B. I. Slavnyy's insufficient consideration of the time factor and of the economic, social and demographic differences between developing countries (we must not forget that the book deals with the problems of the entire developing world) in his analysis of the phenomenon of overpopulation (for example, its effects on the system of world capitalist division of labor). It is quite obvious that the role of demographic processes in socioeconomic development is far from constant in various regions and groups of developing countries.

We must remember that B. I. Slavnyy's system for the classification of theories, just as any other system of classification, is quite hypothetical. For example, G. Myrdal made an important contribution to the development of the ideas of institutionalism and the peripheral school. Sufficient evidence of this can be found in his books "An International Economy" and "Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions,"* in which he puts forth the well-known theory of the "cleansing effect." In addition, R. Prebisch, prominent member of the peripheral school, contributed to the further development of the ideas of institutionalism.

B. I. Slavnyy's use of a separate sociological category seems rather artificial because it is essentially represented by only one work, however important it might be--G. Myrdal's "Asian Drama." The author was unable to provide a convincing description of the origins and basic features of this current. For example, we can hardly agree with the inclusion of researchers of

* G. Myrdal, "An International Economy," N.Y., 1956; idem., "Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions," London, 1963.

technology transfer among its representatives. Furthermore, the author overestimates the influence of G. Myrdal's work on the theory and practice of developing countries. This current, the author writes, "aroused the interest of politicians and the public...in investments in the human being" (p 116). But this was done long before the appearance of "Asian Drama" in the works of R. Solow, D. Kendrick and T. Schultz, the man directly responsible for the term "human capital," whose conclusions also influenced bourgeois theories of the development of newly liberated countries, including G. Myrdal's own approach. According to B. I. Slavnyy, even the theory of basic needs, which was proposed by specialized UN organizations 8 years after the publication of "Asian Drama," and not 3 years as the book says (p 116), was also influenced by G. Myrdal's work. Of course, there is some truth in this, but the theory was more likely the result of the work of national ILO missions and the innovative reinterpretation of the doctrine of "redistribution with growth" by specialists from the IBRD and the Sussex University Institute on Development in 1974.

L. I. REYSNER (IV [Oriental Studies Institute], USSR Academy of Sciences). LEVELS OF PERCEPTION OF DEVELOPING SOCIETIES. B. I. Slavnyy's book aroused interest primarily because it provides food for thought about some vital issues in the study of newly liberated countries. The work is distinguished by a broad outlook and the discussion of major aspects of the theory and practice of development in non-European societies. We would like to discuss some matters, primarily of a gnosiological nature.

1. The author repeatedly questions the degree to which the classical political economy of the late 18th and 19th centuries, founded by F. Quesnay, A. Smith and D. Ricardo, is applicable to the realities of the contemporary East. Furthermore, his position can essentially be called restrained optimism. It seems to us that this is still one of the most obscure and debatable questions in the science of development. In fact, why should the ideas and systems of 100 or 200 years ago be pertinent and useful in the study of contemporary underdevelopment? Why have these old research methods and concepts survived so long? We can offer one hypothesis: Apparently, the relationship and continuity of social phenomena of the past and present, just as of ideas reflecting and interpreting actual events, are deeper and more organic than they seem on the surface. After all, the political economy of growth and the sociology of development in the capitalist era of free competition and in our day deal with comparable subjects in the study of capitalist-oriented developing societies--with social groups and reproductive systems, which have undergone and are undergoing the transition from traditional to modern forms, from the medieval way of life to the standards and practices of bourgeois society. If there were no universal features in the transitional, multistructured societies in which "the bonds of time are severed," non-Marxist social sciences of the last century would be valued only as antiques. The entire first section of B. I. Slavnyy's work, however, tells us that it is still too early to file the ideas of the founders of bourgeois political economy in archives.

2. The book also suggests that political economic comparisons of the past of developed countries and the present of developing countries cannot provide a complete picture of current processes. Consideration for the general

historical context and the facts of economic and social history is also needed. It is precisely in this context that differences in the patterns and conditions of development in the East and West are particularly apparent. Here we can only mention some of these general differences, without discussing them at length. For example, during the entire classical period of capitalist modernization, countries with a European population fell into groups of leaders and followers, between which relations of rivalry and comprehensive interaction took shape; in other words, the Western community formed a unique medium of international contacts, best suited for economic growth and social development on a bourgeois basis. No Afro-Asian societies were equal partners in this zone of the active formative process: Only Japan became part of the system of more developed bourgeois societies, and not only the era of imperialism and the general crisis of capitalism, but this could not create a fundamentally new situation for the countries of the "Eastern periphery." Besides this, the Eastern countries were also in a worse position because they lacked some of the exogenous conditions promoting rapid capitalist development (and they still lack them). These countries had severely limited space for capitalist growth in breadth because all possibilities for global expansion had already been monopolized by the developed capitalist powers. Furthermore, the latter had infiltrated the internal economic space of the dependent periphery. As a significant result of this geopolitical situation, densely populated Asian agrarian societies never had the necessary preconditions for the transfer of the particular part of their active population which had become "surplus" manpower as a result of the labor-saving tendency of world technical progress and the growth of labor productivity throughout the economy, to underdeveloped and underpopulated regions. In this connection, we should remember that when Europe underwent an all-encompassing industrial revolution and the thorough reorganization of its old agrarian base in 1851-1960, it was able to move more than 60 million people to other regions, especially America, whereas Asia's contribution to the flow of emigrants never exceeded a few million people.* In other words, the Afro-Asian world never had this kind of safety-valve and remained confined within its local and regional boundaries.

3. It appears that the author's conceptual approach is best suited for the description of the situation in such countries as India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt and Bangladesh, where agrarian overpopulation and the deformation of the entire employment system reached maximum intensity, and traditional spheres of the economy, where the majority of the labor force is concentrated, are in a state of degradation. A completely different situation can be seen in medium-sized countries with more favorable factorial proportions--for example, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Ceylon--not to mention the petrodollar group of states or the group most integrated into the world capitalist economy (the so-called new industrial states). Today the general theory of development (if it exists) can no longer ignore differences in the initial conditions and actual models of developing societies: Processes of differentiation have gone too far.

4. The most interesting and promising ideas in this study include B. I. Slavnyy's attempt to relate two aspects of the transitional state of newly

* W. Woodruff, "Impact of Western Man," N.Y., 1967, pp 105, 106.

liberated countries--their underdevelopment as an internal inhibitor and their dependence as an external inhibitor. The author views this integral relationship as a connection between the accumulation of capital on the global scale and the expanded reproduction of unemployment and the traditional complex in the peripheral countries. Here is one of the author's most apt remarks on this problem: "The theory of underdevelopment can provide practical recommendations of value to developed and developing countries only if it stops ignoring the problems of overpopulation and relates them to the problems of the accumulation of capital on the global scale and the establishment of the world economy" (p 230).

In general, the information in B. I. Slavnyy's book and his analysis clearly indicate that internal factors and mechanisms of underdevelopment have been given priority in theoretical, analytical and informational analyses. Studies of the external facets of interaction by the centers and periphery of the bourgeois structure, largely due to abrupt changes in world economic conditions, are still not thorough: In this case, science is not keeping up with practice.

In Southwest Asia population figures even decreased for many centuries and only began to display the opposite tendency in the 19th century.

M. A. CHESHKOV (MEMO, USSR Academy of Sciences). FROM CRITICISM TO A NEW THEORY. The originality of B. I. Slavnyy's work is first seen in his concentration on the criticism of unorthodox theories of underdevelopment. The thoroughly discerning nature of his study is also apparent: He draws a clear distinction between the phenomenon (underdevelopment) and its theoretical interpretations (theories of underdevelopment and dependence); the progression of ideas is compared to the real course of events, which gives the critic an opportunity to reveal unexpected metamorphoses in some economic ideas--for example, Keynesian ideas (p 71); the description of the real course of events in the book serves as background material and as an indication of the activity of specific social forces (government dignitaries, non-traditionalist "figures" and small-scale businessmen). B. I. Slavnyy cogently demonstrates the actual significance of various postulates in these theories, such as, for example, the relationship between capital and market factors in S. Amin's theory (p 183).

There are also different definitions of the subject matter of the political economy of underdevelopment in the book: According to one of them, the theory in question is examined through the prism of the transition from the Eastern model of the reproduction of live labor to the Western one (p 20); in another case, the same problem is related to the inability of modern production to employ the overwhelming majority of laborers (p 222). Therefore, the political economic theory of underdevelopment is concerned--at least initially--with the pre-colonial structure, judging by the first definition, and the type of production in isolation from its societal form (or production relations), judging by the second. These definitions do not coincide, but they also do not contradict concepts of the essence of the theory of underdevelopment. In the final analysis, the political economy of underdevelopment, according to B. I. Slavnyy, can be situated at the crossroads of studies of pre-colonial--or, hypothetically, "Asian"--structures and capital. The scope of this vantage point is appealing: It applies to Orientalists and to researchers of the

modern developing society. In line with this definition, the political economic theory of underdevelopment is a clarification of not the pre-colonial structures and not capital, but their points of "contact." If this interpretation of B. I. Slavnyy's position is accurate, we can assume that this theoretical construct should be preceded by theoretical abstractions of a higher order, which can only be expressed in specific terms: either in reference to pre-colonial structures or in reference to capital. Only in the presence of this initial--higher and more general--abstraction can the relationship between "specifically Asian features" and capital be investigated. The author does not make any mention of the level of abstraction on which his understanding of the political economic theory of underdevelopment rests. Therefore, his definition of the subject matter of the political economic theory of underdevelopment reflects the widespread controversy in foreign explanations of underdevelopment--either as a result of pre-colonial structures or as a result of the effects of the world capitalist market.

We must admit that B. I. Slavnyy clarifies the idea of "contact"* by referring to "capitalism of a special type." His contribution to the interpretation of this currently popular concept consists in his emphasis on the reciprocal effects of the market and capitalism and on the status of the masses excluded from national production. This leads him to the necessity of defining the essence of the relations between the state and the destitute masses, the state and hired labor and small-scale producers, the state and small-scale businessmen (see pp 97, 111 et passim). But he regards these relations either from the practical standpoint (can the state and capital solve the problem of overpopulation?) or defines them in the terms of traditional and quasi-traditional relations. In our opinion, the discussion of these relations can hardly be worded in the terms of neo-feudal or, in the broader context, rental relations. A definition of the nature of these relations requires not only the clarification of the background of the term "capital," but also a transfer from this set of concepts to a definition based on Marx' idea about the negative resolution of conflicts between labor and capital. Some other terms B. I. Slavnyy uses (resources, technology), his interpretation of traditional relations (p 97), his view of cost and non-cost relations and so forth can also be examined within the bounds of this political economic theory. Therefore, it appears that the political economy of underdevelopment is not the political economy of any specific structure, particularly the political economy of capitalism. This conclusion should be underscored in view of the fact that there is an increasing tendency today to include the developing countries in the capitalist world either through analyses of transnational corporations or with the aid of discussions of different echelons of world capitalist development or of the world capitalist method of production. In our opinion, none of these concepts accurately reflects the actual growth of capitalism because they ignore the internal contradiction of capitalism that makes it relative--that is, only one of the tendencies in the social evolution of developing countries.

Following B. I. Slavnyy's line of reasoning, we can ask the following question: How valid is the definition of the theory of underdevelopment as merely a

* This is in reference to the lack of clarity in defining the level of theoretical abstraction on which the very content of the idea is based.

political economic theory? The author believes that political economy must be supplemented by historical sociology and vice versa (p 110). But he does not define the relationship between these two analytical complexes clearly enough, considering, at the very least, the equal significance of the problems of overpopulation and capital accumulation. The critic's references to historical sociology also need clarification. What B. I. Slavnyy is referring to is most likely the historical analysis of institutions (p 74). In our opinion, sociology should concern itself with descriptions of the type of society or the historical type of social relations (personal and material relations and their combination). As for the interaction of political economy and historical sociology in the theory of underdevelopment, both of these complexes have a common analytical basis in the term "socioeconomic structure." This well-known premise should be clarified so that the term "socioeconomic structure" will not be confined to the "method of production." Unfortunately, B. I. Slavnyy has not paid enough attention to these two categories, with the possible exception of his analysis of S. Amin's views. Amin's attempts to distinguish between the concepts of "structure" and "production method" seem positive to us because the second category is quite often substituted for the first, even in Marxist studies. But S. Amin's distinction is inconsistent and not quite accurate. When he transfers these categories to a more concrete level, where the interaction of various production methods is examined, he does not consider the need to clarify these categories. As a result, the world capitalist system is defined as the world capitalist structure. This kind of direct transfer of analytical categories to the practical level is even more characteristic of I. Wallerstein's works. Therefore, the critic's task consists in clarifying analytical terms and in making them specific when they are used in relation to the theory of underdevelopment. The eradication of the distinction between general and specific theories, characteristic of studies of developing countries in the most diverse fields of the social sciences, could aid the critic in this process.

Yu. G. ALEKSANDROV (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences). WORLD CAPITAL AND OVER-POPULATION IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. B. I. Slavnyy's work is noteworthy primarily because of some important features of the author's approach to his subject matter. The first thing that arouses our interest is the intention to reveal the common trends in the evolution of the views of non-Marxist political economists researching the developing countries and the desire to determine not so much the official lines of demarcation between various schools as their actual progression (regarding the consistent advancement of mistaken ideas to their logical conclusion as this kind of progression). This gives the work an exceptionally concentrated nature. Secondly, without confining himself to an analysis of the initial premises and internal logic of these theories, the author tries to point up new possibilities in the scientific interpretation of the economic underdevelopment and dependence of developing countries.

This compound approach seems to have produced perceptible positive results. The author has revealed the main defects of the approaches of theorists of various currents to the object of their research and has described the general evolution of scientific ideas in non-Marxist political economy about the distinctive features of the developing economy and its place in the world

capitalist economy (WCE). It is clear that although the various analytical currents have not converged, their actual errors are committed in essentially the same area: The unresolved fundamental issues of political economy in relation to developing countries are clearly connected with the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of their labor resources, most of which are now in the so-called traditional sector of their economy. This applies to the domestic problems of developing countries, their external problems connected with their position in the WCE and the problems of the WCE as a whole.

In the field of non-Marxist political economic theories concentrating on the study of internal factors of economic underdevelopment, a definite change is particularly noticeable in the transition from theories of economic growth to sociological theories. The view of the main object of research becomes more complex: A transition is made from the examination of the integral phenomenon of economic backwardness to the study of two interrelated phenomena--economic backwardness and underdevelopment. As B. I. Slavnyy remarks in this connection, "the subject matter of underdevelopment is new and has nothing in common with the subject matter of the initial stage of capitalist development in Western countries" (p 52). Furthermore, "the real scientific problem consists not in establishing the differences between the traditional and modern economies, but in establishing the differences between the traditional economy and the backward economy in the process of modernization" (p 104). Consequently, the ultimate question is whether or not the capitalist-oriented developing countries will have to repeat the historical patterns of economic progress undergone by today's industrial capitalist countries.

In the sphere of the non-Marxist theories of the dependence of developing countries, the author points up a fundamentally important feature--a change in approaches to the explanation of the causes of underdevelopment and dependence. These theories display the rejection of attempts to explain the exploitation of countries on the WCE periphery by its centers as some kind of automatic mechanism securing the one-way flow of economic resources from the former to the latter. Instead, they propose approaches based on the belief in the complex and qualitatively diverse economic territory of the WCE with a structure determined largely by the quantitative and qualitative parameters of manpower in its various parts--primarily the centers and the periphery. As B. I. Slavnyy demonstrates, the main object of research in theories of dependence is the sphere of interaction by the economic centers of the WCE and the modern sector of the developing economy.

Consequently, both groups of theories examined by B. I. Slavnyy deal with all three basic elements of the WCE structure--the centers and the modern and traditional sectors of the developing economy--and, therefore, with three indissolubly connected aspects of the development of newly liberated countries: their economic underdevelopment, backwardness and dependence. But these aspects, examined in various combinations in theories of growth, sociological theories and theories of dependence, are isolated from one another. As B. I. Slavnyy remarks, the specialization of various fields of non-Marxist science with regard to the socioeconomic problems of developing countries "permitted the analysis of either internal or external factors" and, for this reason, "the severe difficulties of the present stage of its development are largely due to the incorrect division of the common subject matter" (p 4). This is a

major methodological defect (but not the only one) of each of these fields and of all of them in combination.

This leads quite logically to the need to find a method of organically combining all of the abovementioned elements of the essentially common subject matter and revealing the actual mechanism of their interaction. There are many unresolved issues in this connection in studies of the reciprocal effects of processes in the centers of the WCE and in the traditional sector of developing countries.

B. I. Slavnyy expresses the opinion that pre-capitalist overpopulation, which has taken on tremendous proportions in the developing countries, can serve as this kind of connecting link (applicable to all elements of the WCE centers and periphery) (pp 17, 230). The great significance of this phenomenon is attested to by the mere fact (which is consistently corroborated in the book) that none of these theories can disregard this phenomenon, even if it contradicts their basic premises. The factor of overpopulation is not directly present in analyses but serves as background material (in theories of dependence, according to B. I. Slavnyy's eloquent description, it enters theoretical analysis through the back door--p 232) or is simply ignored for the sake of preserving the internal structure of the theories (theories of growth and sociological theories).

Nevertheless, the emphasis B. I. Slavnyy places on overpopulation in his book could arouse some confusion at first. Let us take a look at the place the author assigns to this factor in his discussion. First of all, we should note that he does not view overpopulation as the main cause, or even as a specific, independent cause, of the economic underdevelopment or backwardness of developing countries. For the author this is primarily a connecting link in the chain of factors determining the internal characteristics of the economic systems of developing countries and the specific status of the latter in the WCE, as well as determining the tendencies of its own development.

And it is true that when overpopulation is examined from the vantage point of internal factors, it is directly related to the most fundamental characteristics of productive forces and the economy of developing countries because it is responsible for important features of their labor resources and influences the correlation and methods of interaction of basic production factors, especially in the traditional sector. It is generally, however, assigned the role of a secondary aspect, one which only complicates the socioeconomic problems of these countries but is not directly related to the causes of these problems. We can assume that this attitude is largely due to the tendency to view overpopulation in the developing countries as more of a demographic than a socioeconomic phenomenon. This is also the apparent basis of B. I. Slavnyy's correct observation on the attempts to avoid its direct inclusion in analyses of the causes of economic underdevelopment as a path leading to "demographic determinism" (pp 9-10).

But it is precisely the refusal to include overpopulation as a socioeconomic rather than a demographic phenomenon in the analysis of the characteristics of productive forces in developing countries that substantially diminishes the comprehension of these characteristics, leading to only a partial assessment

of these as characteristics fundamentally similar to those of productive forces in the WCE centers but lagging behind them by one or several phases of development. In this way, the entire subject of the development of newly liberated countries is reduced to the issue of backwardness, and the inability to find factors of underdevelopment in the state of the productive forces of developing countries necessitates a search for causes outside the boundaries of the economic sphere, in the area of superstructural phenomena. It is probable that a more thorough analysis of the fundamental characteristics of productive forces in developing countries could breathe new life into the approaches relating the causes of economic underdevelopment, backwardness and dependence to economic processes in these countries.

If, on the other hand, we look at the problems of the developing countries from the vantage point of external factors, we also find a direct relationship with the factor of overpopulation if only because the expanded reproduction of the WCE (on both the central and peripheral levels) and the overall stability of this system are clearly connected with the problems of including peripheral labor resources in this process. For the centers of the WCE this objective is now more important than the exploitation of the natural resources of developing countries. As for the latter, its importance to them hardly needs special explanation (see p 14 et passim).

The author's ideas about the reciprocal influence of economic processes in the centers of the WCE and in the traditional sector of developing countries and about the connection between the process of accumulation in the WCE and overpopulation in the developing countries are essentially of an introductory nature (see, for example, p 25). In principle, we must agree with his view of overpopulation in the developing countries as a phenomenon whose significance far transcends their boundaries. "At the present time," the author stresses, "the capitalist world is no longer satisfied with using the natural resources of developing countries and including a few, relatively limited segments of the labor force of these countries in the orbit of international capitalist exploitation. We can definitely say that the world capitalist system is actually participating in the expanded reproduction of the human factor in the developing world." He is referring to the world capitalist market's new role in "the process of population reproduction in the developing countries (and of overpopulation as part of this process)" (pp 14-15).

It is probable that the role of the WCE centers in the reproduction of population and overpopulation in the developing countries cannot be confined to the provision of these countries with part of the general supply of resources, stimulated by the need to stabilize the sociopolitical situation on the level of the entire system. The rapid growth of the population in the developing countries is actually one of the important results of their transformation into the WCE periphery, which led to the thorough reorganization of their productive forces, economic units and economic basis. Population growth in today's developing countries, in contrast to traditional pre-capitalist societies of the past, rests on a supply of resources created largely in a different system of productive forces and socioeconomic structures. Furthermore, direct shipments of food from developed capitalist countries can more accurately be viewed as a specific case within the general situation constituting the process of the comprehensive development of the WCE.

By relating processes in various structural parts of the WCE to overpopulation in the developing countries, the author arrives at the main question: Can the rapidly growing labor resources of developing countries with their distinctive features be included effectively in national production under the conditions of capitalist-oriented socioeconomic development? Or is it possible that the accumulation of capital on the global scale leads to compound overpopulation in the traditional sector of developing countries? (p 229).

B. I. Slavnyy's study shows that this question was not stated directly enough in non-Marxist political economy--at least not as a problem for the WCE as a whole. At the same time, the conclusions these theories seem to arrive at are generally pessimistic. For example, theories of growth and sociological theories actually related the need to surmount the backwardness of developing countries to the mobilization of their relatively scarce capital and land resources but ultimately had to acknowledge the inevitability of the indefinite existence of the traditional sector (see pp 65-73, 123). The view of development prospects in theories of dependence is still hopeless. A change was noted only when theorists of dependence reconsidered the meaning of the term "technology" in relation to the modern WCE structure: They ceased to regard the capital-labor ratio as the main objective indicator of economic progress, unequivocally imposing labor-saving technology on developing countries.

V. L. SHEYNIS (IMEMO, USSR Academy of Sciences). THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES REFLECTED IN THEORIES. B. I. Slavnyy's book is an extraordinary addition to the works on the developing countries published in our country in recent years, and for this reason I would like to support the journal's initiative in organizing its discussion. The author has built a convincing logical-historical system of ideas, on the basis of which he has been able to describe, without repeating ideas already expressed in our literature, the progression of analytical thinking in a relatively young field of science, point out the main milestones in its progress and compare three basic ideological and analytical approaches of non-Marxist researchers to the central problems of the developing countries--underdevelopment and dependence. When B. I. Slavnyy examined these theories, he also had to discuss the problems themselves, which have aroused as much lively discussion among Marxist researchers as among scholars with other outlooks. The author has done this overtly in some cases and covertly in others, and therefore any discussion of the book presupposes an exchange of views on the theories and the essence of the problems facing the developing economy and society.

One of the important merits of B. I. Slavnyy's criticism of non-Marxist political economy of the developing countries is his attention to the historical context, which is so inadequate in many other studies of these regions. Just as the modern subject matter of developing countries does not date back to the collapse or even the birth of imperialism's colonial system, the origins of theories interpreting this complex set of facts must be viewed within the context of science's past, and sometimes its quite distant past. This not allows for the accurate assessment, from a broad retrospective vantage point, of the place of concepts now foremost among theoretical ideas with their merits and defects, but also permits the reinterpretation of the entire historical development of economic knowledge.

B. I. Slavnyy's analysis suggests that none of the three main approaches of non-Marxist science--theories of growth, institutional and peripheral--can display sufficient explanatory power in itself or point up the main link in the resolution of existing problems. The author stresses that their resolution cannot be unilaterally related to the extensive incorporation of modern capital-intensive technology (p 69), as theories of growth assumed, or the development of the "new capitalist sector," located beyond the framework of the "sector of modern economic growth," "stratified to the extreme in terms of the types of technology employed, capital-labor ratios, hiring conditions and the quality of manpower" (p 120), as the institutionalists believed (it should be stressed, however, that although the author's remarks about the "utopian technology," just as some of the other recommendations of institutionalists, are justified, their emphasis on the redistribution of resources in favor of the market sector, outside the bounds of economic growth, seem reasonable and constructive if there is no preoccupation with the futile aim of surmounting duality in backward and densely populated countries within a short period of time. The latest studies by Soviet researchers have pointed to a significant advance in this kind of redistribution in India in the 1970's). As for the recommendations made (at least on the level of theory) by consistent supporters of the peripheral theory--concerning the need for the almost complete curtailment of relations with the foreign market (p 193)--their implementation would jeopardize the agents of modernization as well as the very ideals of development.

In my opinion, there is no such "basic link," as is often the case in complex historical situations, in the theory or the reforming practices of developing countries. Nevertheless, the analytical potential accumulated by each of the three currents of analytical thought examined in the book and their strong and weak points are educative in many respects even for us. B. I. Slavnyy's narration is polyphonic, and many specialists will find answers to the questions troubling them. I will discuss the ones that interest me the most.

B. I. Slavnyy's detailed critical analysis of leftist varieties of the peripheral theory seems especially pertinent to me because it is easy to see their similarity to some popular views in our country (and oversimplified ones, in my opinion), stated in a well-written book representing an important milestone in our research, "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: zakonomernosti, tendentsii, perspektivy" [The Developing Countries: Natural Trends, Tendencies and Prospects] (Moscow, 1974). I repeat that I value this work quite highly and believe that it is unparalleled in many respects. Nevertheless, the events of the last decade have demonstrated the excessive rigidity of its ideas about the intensification of dependence and, to put it mildly, the non-universal applicability of the solutions it proposed.

Analyzing the two other currents of analytical thought, the author makes a number of profound and interesting statements. He draws attention to the distinctive features of the growth mechanism in the traditional economy, in which increased production is achieved "only on the condition of the growth of integrated (anonymous) labor expenditures rather than differentiated ones" (that is, ones with distinctive levels of individual labor productivity--V. Sh.) and society's aim is the reproduction of the individual (the constant individual!) rather than the accumulation of wealth (pp 66-68). He points to the

"anomaly" (by European standards) of market processes: "Freedom in the market (market resource transfers) does not lead to the establishment of capitalism, but to the regeneration of a degraded and monetarized form of neo-feudalism" (p 12). There is no question that the researcher of the developing economy encounters this mutation, although it is probably not as comprehensive as the author says. The reader's attention is also directed to the organic (and possibly unavoidable) defect of planning in developing countries, pointed out by G. Myrdal: the abundance of discretionary (or arbitrary) measures depending on specific decisions of officials, and the regulation, when the mechanism of automatic self-regulation is not operating, to which plans assign only "the rules of the game" (pp 90-91).

In the hierarchy of socioeconomic conditions inhibiting development, however, B. I. Slavnyy singles out one, which plays the chief role in his explanation--the factor of overpopulation. The underestimation of this factor, in his opinion, is the reason for the defects in all three analytical approaches and the deviations of actual processes from the models constructed in line with these approaches (pp 73-74, 114-115, 215 et passim). In my opinion, there is good reason to underscore the role of the demographic factor in the perpetuation of underdevelopment. First of all, this should be done because this is one of the main distinctive features of the contemporary situation in contrast to the initial phases of capitalist development in Europe, a feature which, as the author correctly notes, records the transformation of quantity into quality. In the second place, in view of the nature of the still widespread beliefs about the odious character of anything arbitrarily interpreted as "Malthusianism" (B. I. Slavnyy's objective approach to Malthus' ideas appeals to me), a certain tendency toward the other extreme might be a good thing.

Even so, the interpretation of the demographic factor seems somewhat extreme. The thesis that the balance of production factors in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries gradually changed in favor of labor (p 53) requires validation: The tendency does not seem so clear to me. But something else is even more important: The actual relative (and, in some cases, even absolute) overpopulation in the developing countries is certainly not a point of departure for the explanation of the situation, not the "primary cause" of underdevelopment, even if the analysis is confined to the contemporary period. It does not occupy a clearly defined central position in the system of "cause and effect relationships" or the "means and ends" system. When B. I. Slavnyy says that the failures of socioeconomic practice were connected not with the lopsided technical-economic approach but with the strength of opposing forces (p 73), his remarks are accurate, even if they seem paradoxical. But when he goes further and argues with theorists of growth and institutionalists by broadening the term "opposing forces" in such a way that the focus is not on the institutions of traditional society and mental stereotypes (pp 74, 110, 114 et passim), but on population growth as such, the author's insistence begins to appear excessive. Although I object to what I regard as an exaggeration of the demographic factor, I do not want to replace it with any other factor, but I insist on the need for a "multifactoral" explanation of underdevelopment, on an approach in which cause and effect are mutually connected and can exchange places even though they have a distinct hierarchy. With this approach, overpopulation and surplus manpower can be seen as a compound result

of the effects of an entire group of factors--economic and social, modern and traditional--their "mutual superimposition." In particular, the fact that intense labor and the individual's attainable values are stimulated poorly in the culture of many developing societies does not seem secondary to me.

On the whole, however, the author's approach warrants thorough support. Its main features are a recognition of the problematic nature of development in the "Third World" and a skeptical attitude toward the view that the simple manipulation of resources (or, I might add, some other simple method) can "move the system...from an underdeveloped state to a backward state" surmountable by more or less obvious means (p 73). The choice of the last term in relation to Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries does not seem apt (strictly speaking, backwardness is displayed only when the continent is compared with England, and this is not the focus of the analysis), but the main idea--the impossibility of the duplication of the type of social development undergone by the countries which first embarked on the path of capitalist development--is accurate. I would even go further and would not insist on common "stages of formative development" for such diverse social systems (p 53).

Theories of growth have had a decisive effect on economic development, as the author correctly stresses: "Economic growth based on capital involvement and the mass-scale introduction of modern capital-intensive production has been accomplished and is still being accomplished" (p 69); the modern sector of the economy is still expanding, and its influence on the society as a whole is growing stronger (p 116). Although theorists of growth failed to foresee this and underestimated the contradictions accumulated along this path, the experience of many developing countries proves that this path is far from exhausted; it is quite possible that this is a reality with which we will have to deal even in the beginning of the next century. The efforts to move surplus manpower from agriculture to more productive sectors could work, at least in some countries, before the society is shaken by social conflicts as the Iranian society was. Theories of growth have also had an important impact on other sectors of social thought: For example, I feel that the adoption of some aspects of the theory of functional dualism by Soviet researchers, who have displayed an increasing interest in the topic of tradition, has been useful.

We could hardly disagree with the statement that ideological and sociopolitical consolidation in many developing societies has taken place on the basis of different varieties of the theory of dependence, even when economic policy has been inspired by other principles. Here the merger of the ideological and practical functions of non-Marxist researchers was particularly distinct. B. I. Slavnyy's sarcastic comment that "radicalism, combining tacit approval of the domestic order with pointed criticism and accusations of foreign forces, is harmless and can even do some good" (p 194) is absolutely correct. It must be borne in mind, however, that the author's criticism of the implementation of the peripheral theory (economic outlays, the undermining of the ideals of modernization, etc., p 192) is not likely to sound convincing to its protagonists. In the first place, the system of values of this theory (I join the author in agreeing with G. Myrdal, who underscored the initial and autonomous nature of values in scientific comprehension, pp 104-106, 238)

does not attach much importance to the "ideals of modernization," and the measurement of losses is substantial only within the framework of a system of economic thought comparing expenditures to results. Consistent supporters of the theory of dependence will not be frightened by the prospect of the "demise of the modern sector" either (p 229). In the second place, and this is the main thing, the radical recommendations of theories of dependence are meant for implementation only in extreme cases, and have another purpose for mass consumption.

The ideas of the sociological, institutional current or, in the broader context, the interrelated analysis of economic and social factors of underdevelopment appear to have more educative potential, especially for us. Although it hardly seems likely that a precise hierarchy of inhibiting factors, common to all developing countries, could be constructed, I feel that the entire group of social conditions is of primary significance, both because social factors are more independent of economic ones here than they once were in Europe, less controllable and more firmly rooted in traditional soil than economic factors involved in the process of growth, and because many of us still have to surmount--as K. Marx once advised his followers to do--the oversimplifying rigidity of economic determinism. B. I. Slavnyy's criticism of the sociological school's tendency to view phenomena more from the standpoint of historical origins than from the political economic standpoint could be correct, but we must not forget that the political economic approach also has its limits and that it proposes only one system of abstractions, and not the higher level made up of all systems. The indisputable conclusion drawn by the reader of B. I. Slavnyy's original and analytical work is that synthesis is essential. The synthesis of scientific fields and approaches to the study of the complex problems of the developing society is also an important objective for Marxist researchers.

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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK EXAMINES SOURCES OF SAHEL'S ECOLOGICAL CRISIS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 84 (signed to press 20 Nov 84) pp 167-170

[Review by N. M. Bragina of book "Strany Sakhelya (sostovaniye prirodnoy sredy i problemy razvitiya sel'skogo khozyaystva)" [The Sahel Countries (The State of the Environment and Problems in Agricultural Development)] by G. F. Radchenko, Moscow, Mysl', 1983, 261 pages]

[Text] The resolution of one of mankind's urgent problems--the restoration of the ecological balance, disturbed by industrial development--is closely related to another equally urgent problem: the eradication of centers of mass hunger. In the 1970's the Sahel region became one of these centers. The long distances between most of this zone and the seacoast and the arid or semi-arid climate of the zone have made the conditions of human existence in the region bleak and unpredictable. In this kind of marginal situation, even the slightest disruption of the centuries-old balance between man and nature as a result of human economic activity can have tragic consequences.

This--the state of the environment in the Sahel countries and the possibility of preventing the tragic conclusion to the rapid degradation of natural conditions in these countries--is the subject of the book being reviewed. The causes of the Sahel tragedy of the 1970's are discussed in great detail in the book. The author shows how the interaction of certain elements of Western industrial experience and traditional economic systems in a zone with a fragile ecological balance generally causes short-term successes to be followed by long-term ecological imbalances. The destruction of traditional economic practices, based on man's unconditional observance of the laws of nature, caused a chain reaction of uncontrollable spontaneous processes. G. F. Radchenko dates the beginnings of the ecological imbalance in the Sahel zone to the period of French colonization. The author conclusively states that the economic policy of these countries after they won their independence (that is, from the 1960's on) objectively intensified the severance of man's traditional ties and relations with nature. Following Western models of industrial development, the Sahel countries resolved to step up industrialization. The use of a purely economic criterion in development strategies and the tendency to disregard actual ecological conditions, just as the objective possibility of establishing modern power-intensive production in the majority of these countries, led, as the author demonstrates, to a paradoxical situation: Countries where 70-90 percent of the economically active population works in agriculture have to import their staple foods.

In search of the causes of the current ecological difficulties and food crisis, the author analyzes the most suitable forms of economic activity for the conditions of the Sahel countries. Extensive dry farming and pasture livestock breeding, the limits of which were set by the centuries of natural mutual adaptation by man and nature, are still, in the author's valid opinion, the optimal forms of economic activity. The disruption of the traditional coexistence of these methods of farming was primarily the result of the "intensification of the anthropogenic impact on the environment in the Sahel countries" (p 187).

The first gap was created, as mentioned above, by the interference of French colonizers, which "disrupted traditional food and socioeconomic structures and relations and was detrimental to the environment" (p 187), because the main purpose of their activity was "the quickest possible and maximal derivation of profits from colonies" (pp 187-188).

The second perceptible strike at the ecological balance was extremely unexpected. The spread of Western medical discoveries and the struggle against epidemic diseases "increased life expectancy and lowered the mortality rate with no change in the high birth rate," G. F. Radchenko writes. "The rapid growth of the population was not accompanied by economic progress. Under these new conditions of demographic pressure, the old traditional extensive farming methods still prevailed, and this put an increasingly heavy load on land resources" (p 188).

The development of export farming, which dates back to the colonial period, ultimately intensified the pressure on the land, because it "diminished resources of grazing land, reduced the length of fallow periods and posed a serious ecological threat" (p 190). The disruption of the comprehensive system of traditional farming on Sahel land was the first link in an endless chain of ecologically disastrous innovations. New types of agricultural implements began to be used widely during the development of export farming, and their use often had a negative effect on the environment. "They wanted too much too soon from the land, and did too little (if anything) too slowly for its restoration" (p 192).

Plowing before the land had been completely and thoroughly cleared compounded the negative ecological effects of extensive farming. In general, technical innovations produced a short-term impact on Sahel lands: Rapid production growth was followed by diminished fertility and diminished yield. For this reason, the "eulogy" to the hoe in the book is not paradoxical; it is the logical result of the author's entire analysis of the natural ability of Sahel lands to adapt to the benefits of technical progress. "It is probable," the author writes, "that the outdated, widely and often justifiably criticized hoe can regulate man's effect on the environment in extensive farming and can protect the land against accelerated degradation: It limits the peasant's physical ability to cultivate land, limits the use of new lands and limits the waste of land resources" (p 191). In the marginal conditions of the Sahel, the hoe was something like an instrument confining human demands to the capabilities of the land.

The technogenic factors of the disruption of ecosystems can be categorized as the most "effective." Both the highly intensive agriculture of developed industrial countries in the northern hemisphere and the extensive farming of developing countries are experiencing--each in its own way--the negative effects of some aspects of technical progress. For example, intensive farming in developed countries is accompanied by the erosion of the soil, and the intensive use of chemicals in Japanese paddy farming has been accompanied by the pollution of rivers and reservoirs and the salinization of the soil. However, the existence of agriculture as an organic part of an integral system of industrial production, the stability of ecosystems and the ability to regenerate them quickly--conditions characteristic of the countries of the northern hemisphere--have successfully precluded irreversible damage to date. The addition of certain elements of Western technology to traditional economic systems without considering their possible side-effects, however, can lead, as the Sahel experience proves, to tragic results, and the methods of correcting this situation are still not fully known.

Just as the effective struggle against epidemic diseases intensified the pressure of the population on the territory, the improvement of veterinary services has secured the rapid growth of the herd of livestock, which also puts a much heavier load on the land in view of the traditional low slaughter level. The conflict between the "hoe and cow" (the enlargement of sown areas reduces the size of pastures), resulting from the disruption of the traditional symbiosis of farming and animal husbandry, was "an important cause of the disruption of the equilibrium in the 'man-environment' system" (p 194). The resulting overgrazing by livestock "will eventually become one of the main factors turning some areas into desert" (p 195).*

The "pump revolution" also had an adverse effect on the environment. Plans for profound progressive changes entailed the establishment of large wells or pumps in locations of traditional livestock breeding. But the resulting "anarchy" in the use of land resources by livestock breeders and farmers and the excessive concentration of people and livestock around the new sources of water led to a situation in which "these areas with abundant supplies of water often became centers of devastation" (p 198).

The progressive deforestation of large areas was one of the main man-made factors in the destruction of the Sahel environment. Increasing urbanization led to a higher demand for fuel, and this has led to the continuous enlargement of deforested territories and forests doomed to annihilation in the Sahel, where wood is the main source of energy, if not the only one, for 90 percent of the population (pp 198, 200).

The interaction of all of these negative factors resulted in erosion, which threatens to make the process of desertification irreversible.

The incompatibility of the forms and methods of incorporating the achievements of modern Western industrialization with local conditions has had undesirable

* "According to some estimates, the number of livestock in some Sahel regions in 1970 was twice as high as the capacity of grazing lands" (pp 194-195).

effects in regions other than the Sahel as well. The group of factors detrimental to local ecosystems which G. F. Radchenko discusses in detail in his book (although some of these factors are progressive in themselves from the social and humanitarian standpoint) is operating in almost all of the economically underdeveloped countries of the southern hemisphere. This group of factors consists in the following diverse but internally related characteristics: a lower mortality rate and a longer average life expectancy without any corresponding adjustment of the birth rate; the reduction of livestock diseases without an increase in livestock slaughter or marketability; the creation of central water supplies without any regulation of relations between farmers and livestock breeders or any control over migration patterns; the use of new agricultural implements, equipment and vehicles on a highly unstable soil cover without additional fortification; the destruction of forests and other vegetation as a result of the uncontrolled growth of cities without any organized efforts at regeneration.

Although desertification as a result of human economic activity is the main theme of G. F. Radchenko's study, he does not believe that the situation is completely hopeless. "Whereas now...natural desertification as a result of the arid climate cannot be combated, the tendency toward desertification through man's fault can and must be stopped" (p 211). Examining all facets of existing plans for the restoration of Sahel natural conditions, the author conclusively demonstrates the utopian nature of some of them (for example, the plan to create a Sahel "green belt") and the definite positive prospects of others, particularly the long-range plans based on the principle of "the close coordination of the territorial structure and organization of farming with the territorial level of ecological stability" (pp 217-218). The author stresses that the tendency seen in the 1970's toward the replacement of intensive programs for the cultivation of commercial crops with effective support of the production of food crops for local consumption could eradicate the negative consequences of the economically and ecologically unsound addition of elements of industrial agriculture to traditional farming and aid in solving the problem of securing the necessary food supply for the population.

The author's thoroughly substantiated and, in our opinion, correct statement about the need for extreme caution in the use of new Western improvements and technologies in areas with unstable ecosystems warrants special attention. In particular, the author substantiates his opinion that dry farming best meets the conditions of the Sahel. The author recommends specific ways of intensifying farming and enhancing its productivity (p 232), and these will be of practical value.

Without embarking on any special analysis of the social aspects of economic life in the Sahel countries, G. F. Radchenko nevertheless conveys some understanding of this subject as well. According to the author, for example, the widespread primitive communal relations in the region are still operating quite efficiently. He conclusively proves the need for transitional forms during the ecologically sound incorporation of new technology and the maximal use of traditional forms of economic activity wherever "nature is particularly sensitive to man's influence." The suggestion in G. F. Radchenko's book that the innovations in the Sahel failed not because of the conservatism of

farmers and livestock breeders, but because of the absence of a base for these innovations also applies to modernization programs in some other developing countries. The best-known example of this might be the "green revolution," the curtailment of which was due largely to the absence of the conditions it required (economic underdevelopment, mass illiteracy, etc.).

The book was ultimately written to find the answer to a specific question-- Can a territory with extremely rigid natural conditions provide its inhabitants with their minimal food requirements? This is a pertinent question for many economically underdeveloped countries. G. F. Radchenko correctly connects an affirmative response to this question with the kind of development strategy that would envisage the intergovernmental coordination of efforts to combat desertification and would also emphasize a decentralized approach to the organization of farming in zones where conditions are deteriorating, and particularly in unstable zones. An essential condition for the future self-sufficiency of developing countries in terms of food supplies is, as the experience of the Sahel countries demonstrates, a transition (which began in the 1970's) to the priority development of agriculture, and not industrialization by means of the intensification of extractive and export industries. The entire book suggests that only an intelligent combination of traditional forms and innovations, the maximal use of the possibilities of extensive farming and the active encouragement of the broader use of intermediate technology in agriculture can create stable prospects for the restoration of the disrupted balance between man and nature.

In conclusion, I would like to underscore the humanistic tone of this book. It unequivocally states that mankind's future can be assured if man makes maximum use of the possibilities of progress to restore and maintain the balance between human beings and their environment.

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BOOK SEES ANALOGIES BETWEEN EARLY KUOMINTANG, MODERN EAST

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[Review by N. A. Simoniya of book "Rabocheye dvizheniye v gomin'danovskom Kitaye. 1927-1937 gg." [The Labor Movement in Kuomintang China. 1927-1937] by T. N. Akatova, Moscow, Glav. red. vost. lit-ry izd-va "Nauka," 1983, 272 pages]

[Excerpts] Questions connected with the formation of the working class and its movements in the Eastern countries are among the topics that have been given far too little attention by Soviet Orientalists. There are a number of objective reasons for this: the still debatable nature of cardinal aspects of the formative development of these countries; the clearly distinctive features of the formation of classes in these countries, particularly the proletariat; the extremely unsatisfactory state of statistics, which complicates the complete and scientific definition of the quantitative and qualitative parameters of the class as a whole and of its separate factions, and this is particularly important in the formative stage. This is why the publication of this new work on an important and little-researched period in the labor movement of a country as large as China is particularly reassuring. The significance of this publication can be examined in two contexts--in the narrow context of purely Chinese subject matter, and in the broader, international context, in view of the universal aspects and similarities of some central features of the workers and communist movement in Eastern countries.

Within the context of Chinese subject matter, the broad range of topics discussed in the book is of primary importance. T. N. Akatova analyzes the dynamics of the proletariat's development and its structural changes during the years of the economic and political crisis of this period; the confrontations between the CCP and Kuomintang; the labor policy of the Kuomintang; the ultra-leftist and sectarian errors committed by the CCP in the guidance of the labor movement and the Comintern's assistance in surmounting them; the development of the legal union movement and the activities of underground red trade unions; the daily economic struggle of the workers for their vital interests and the massive patriotic anti-Japanese demonstrations of the industrial proletariat.

Several of the topics and events discussed in the book transcend the bounds of purely Chinese subject matter by their very nature and their significance.

Above all, China was the first to display the phenomenon of the neo-Bonapartist type of military-bureaucratic dictatorship, which was later seen in several Eastern countries--both semicolonial (for example, Turkey and Thailand) and former colonial countries that had won their independence (Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and others). It is therefore understandable that T. N. Akatova's analysis of the Kuomintang dictatorship will be interesting and useful to specialists studying the political regimes of Eastern countries. Rejecting the standard appraisals of this regime, she reveals the dual nature of the Kuomintang dictatorship and its complex and contradictory base, representing a compulsory compromise between the bourgeoisie and part of the proletariat. This is of indisputable importance because the confrontations and compromises of these two classes, in our opinion, were the basis of the relative autonomy of the Kuomintang superstructure and its seemingly "classless" nature.

In our opinion, the main issue is the "mediating" role of the Kuomintang between labor and capital, which is discussed at such length and in such detail by T. N. Akatova and which allowed the regime to aspire to a "supra-class" position in society. The simple adjective "bourgeois" does not seem adequate here. The main feature of Bonapartism is precisely the ability of this political regime to walk the tightrope between classes and to eradicate extreme signs of the social nature of the main classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, for the sake of a strategy aimed at securing the general conditions of capitalist evolution. Although the author describes the general bourgeois nature of the Kuomintang, she does not mention the specifically Bonapartist nature of the regime, which makes it more than just a spokesman of bourgeois interests or, in K. Marx' definition, "dictatorship by the bourgeoisie with the aid of sabers," but "dictatorship by the saber over the bourgeois society"* (considering the fact that China was then in an extremely early stage of bourgeois social development).

The author clearly shows how far the Kuomintang regime was prepared to go against the selfish immediate interests of the Chinese bourgeoisie for the sake of consolidating the exploitative order as a whole. The Kuomintang policy of "pacifying" the working class warrants the most serious consideration by researchers specializing in the labor movement in countries with military-bureaucratic or nationalist dictatorships and in the role and policy of progressive forces in these countries. The following statement by T. N. Akatova is particularly significant: "The labor policy of the Kuomintang, distinguished by social demagogy on the broadest scale, was nevertheless sufficiently complex, flexible and maneuverable and, what is most important, was 'based' to some extent on real concern for the needs of the working class, which made it incomparably more dangerous for the proletarian cause than mere demagogy" (p 68). We must admit that this aspect of the labor policy of contemporary neo-Bonapartist regimes in the East is often underestimated or artificially simplified, and this inevitably leads to self-deception and errors in the appraisal of the actual balance of power and the immediate prospects for struggle.

* K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 7, p 39.

The author's interpretation of the levels and nature of working class political awareness is quite pertinent in relation to the present-day communist movement in the East. It seems to us that T. N. Akatova is correct in assuming that "when the social significance and specific historical role of the Chinese working class are being determined, it is just as wrong to ignore its weak points and the difficulties in its class indoctrination and organization as to absolutize these weak points" (p 5). On the basis of a thorough analysis, she arrives at important conclusions regarding the "organic connection" between the Chinese labor movement of 1927-1937 and the "nationwide struggle, the mainstream of the revolutionary process," regarding the "decisive role" of the factor of nationality in activity by the workers (that is, anger at foreign oppression) and regarding the fact that "the Chinese proletariat acquired a national consciousness long before it acquired a class consciousness" (see pp 228-229, 5). In this connection, the author conclusively proves that it is precisely the underestimation of the anti-imperialist incentive in the labor movement and the overestimation of the level of class and political awareness of the Chinese proletariat that caused the CCP's ultra-leftist errors and its ultimate alienation from the working class.

A correct understanding of the national and social factors in the revolutionary struggle of Eastern countries in general and the interpretation of these issues in relation to the "labor question" in particular have been (and still are) of decisive importance in the fate of many communist parties in this region. Sufficient evidence of this can be seen in the 1948 defeat of the Communist Party of Indonesia at the height of the Indonesian people's armed liberation struggle, which was primarily a result of an incorrect understanding of the relationship between national and social factors. Furthermore, the inaccurate interpretation of these matters continued to affect the party later--for example, the thesis of the "failure of the August revolution" in 1948, when it was actually the attempt to transcend the bounds of the "August revolution" that failed; that is, to transcend the bounds of the Indonesian people's national-liberation revolutionary struggle. In this connection, it should be noted that the pertinence of this matter in light of the prolonged (up to the present day) rift between workers and communist movements in several Southeast Asian countries is indisputable, and that the correct resolution of the problem is essential.

In conclusion, we would like to say that the thorough analysis of major topics of scientific and political importance puts T. N. Akatova's work among the first-rate studies of the history of the Chinese revolution and the history of the workers and communist movement.

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BOOK ON INFLUENCE OF ISLAM ON TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 84 (signed to press 20 Nov 84) pp 190-195

[Review by I. L. Fadeyeva of book "Islam and Political Development in Turkey" by Binnaz Toprak, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1981, 164 pages, index on pages 160-164]

[Text] The subject of this review, a book by Binnaz Toprak, a Turkish researcher and an instructor at the University of the Bosphorus, reveals Islam's role in Turkey's political history and discusses the distinctive features of the interaction of political and religious institutions in this country's history from the Middle Ages to our day. The book consists of an introduction, five chapters and a conclusion. In the introduction the author examines the general aspects of religion's influence in Eastern and Western politics. B. Toprak categorizes present-day Turkey as one of the countries where the population is virtually homogeneous in the religious respect and where religious conflicts do not pose a serious threat to the political stability of society. In our opinion, the author oversimplifies the matter when she speaks of religious homogeneity because she does not take the existence of various sects and currents within the dominant religions into account. Besides this, although Turkey can be relegated to a category in general, we must not forget that the cultural development of this country and the evolution of its religious institutions have a number of unique features, stemming from its unique history, and that these do not fit into any general system of classification.

Secularization was already being discussed in the Ottoman society in the 18th century along with the process of Europeanization, but it was not until the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 that, as the author says, the connection between Islam, constituting a major portion of the Ottoman cultural tradition, and the state was broken: Among the Westernizing reforms of the 19th and early 20th centuries, only Mustafa Kemal's secularist program had the aim of substituting a Western culture for the Islamic one (p 1). It seems to us that the author is not quite correct on this point. It is known that the Kemalist reforms, which were largely based on the analytical theories of famous Turkish philosopher and sociologist Ziya Gek Alp, did not have this aim. The importance of adopting some of the political institutions and technological achievements of the West and simultaneously retaining

national cultural traditions, shaped under the influence of Islam, was underscored in the works of Gek Alp and in the speeches of M. Kemal. What they both actually wanted was the eradication of religion's influence on politics. As it turned out, however, Islam, as a stable system of legal, ethical and cultural values and standards, essentially opposed to Western bourgeois values, seriously inhibited the process of Kemalist modernization according to Western patterns. As a result, a struggle by Kemalists against Islam became unavoidable, and the transformation of the Muslim society acquired the nature of forcible reforms conducted from above by the ruling elite among the broad masses that were still unprepared to accept them (p 2). It was also impossible, as B. Toprak correctly points out, to remove Islam completely from Turkish politics. Religious institutions were not completely separate from the state, but served more as one of its weapons during the period of the unipartite system (1923-1946), which was, in the author's opinion, an essential condition for Turkey's transformation into a modern state.

Compulsory secularization not only gave rise to opposition in the form of religious anti-Kemalist movements during the first years of the Republic of Turkey's existence, but also widened the gap between the elite and mass cultures. This became particularly noticeable after the institution of the multipartite system in 1946, which gave rise to a new form of religious politicization: Religion began to play the most important role in the political mobilization of the rural population in the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's. Even after 1946, however, the Kemalist elite, according to B. Toprak, continued to view the use of religion in politics with apprehension and suspicion. This was due, on the one hand, to the Kemalist tendency to associate the decline of the Ottoman state with the inflexibility of Muslim traditions and, on the other hand, to the fact that the main supporters of the politicization of Islam--religious conservatives--always rejected Kemalism and placed their hopes in a return to theocracy in some form. The author's opinion that the popular academic thesis about the growing strength of the Islamic factor in Eastern politics in recent years is inaccurate warrants attention. This factor, according to B. Toprak, has always existed and has merely taken new forms in the last decade in accordance with the new level of socioeconomic and cultural development in Eastern countries.

Discussing various Western approaches to the study of the process of modernization, the author clarifies her own research project as an attempt to determine the degree to which traditions promote sweeping social and political changes and the ways in which the modernizing elite can use them in its reformist activity (p 7). In the final analysis, this is simply a matter of religion's role in the political development of society. This, the author says, does not mean that the religious factor opposes change in principle. Religious movements of the past and present have demanded changes in the status quo. These movements are often headed by the opposition leaders of religious currents or sects. For example, Buddhism came into being as a religion of protest by the emerging commercial classes against the rigidity of the Hindu caste system (p 9). In the same way, the birth of Shiism was not only the result of dogmatic disagreements, but also a form of social protest against the dominant position of the Sunnite ruling elite. According to the Turkish scholar, an example of the productive participation of traditional symbols and values in the modernization of society can be seen in

Japan, where the state religion did not impede the stepped-up socioeconomic development of the country (p 10).

It is also true, however, that religion has often defended the traditional order and has taken a protective stance. In exchange, orthodox religions have received the official acknowledgement of the state and its economic support. This is why revolutionary movements strive to eradicate the dominant religious system in addition to the institutions of the old regime.

Therefore, religious institutions can help or hinder forces for change. In this process, they also undergo transformation. Religious differences become a significant factor in domestic policy when they interact with class, ethnic, linguistic and regional types of social differences (p 18).

In Chapter Two, "Islam as a Political Religion," B. Toprak discusses the well-known thesis of the connection between state and religious institutions in the Ottoman society and underscores Islam's unique status as a simultaneously religious, philosophical and legal system. According to J. Smith's system of classification, Islam is an organic religion, in contrast to the so-called church religions. The political thrust of Islam and the merger of state and religious institutions in Islamic societies, the author remarks, are connected with the conditions under which this religion came into being and Muhammad fought his battle with the Mecca ruling elite. Muhammad was as much a political leader as a religious prophet. His success in the formation and reinforcement of the Muslim community was simultaneously a religious and a political achievement.

As for the religious organization in the Ottoman Empire, it represented part of the machinery of state, closely related to the administrative structure by a vast network of establishments on the central and provincial levels. Religion had clearly defined social and political functions in the Ottoman society. "Although in the 19th century," B. Toprak writes, "the term 'Osmanlı' was a quasi-national definition of Ottoman citizenship, this meaning was unknown to the majority of the population, which knew of the state's existence only through contacts with tax collectors. The collective identity of the majority of the empire's Muslim subjects was acknowledged only in religious terms. For non-Muslims it also signified primarily religious community" (p 27). Here, however, the author loses sight of the fact that it was precisely in the 19th century that the intensive development of national awareness was occurring, first among non-Muslim nationalities and then among the Turks themselves, giving rise to conflicts not only with the Muslim state and the dominant nationality but also within the Christian community (for example, Greco-Bulgarian disagreements). This complicated the institution of the Tanzimat reforms that were supposed to consolidate and modernize the Ottoman state. An interesting feature of B. Toprak's study is her development of the idea of orthodox Islam as a collectivist religion (in contrast, for instance, to Buddhism). The author underscores its anti-individualism and its intolerance for separatist movements of all types. She refers to the hypothesis of famous Turkish scholar Sherif Mardin, according to whom the most important function of religion in the Ottoman society was its mediating role between the individual and the state. When a network of secondary structures was gradually taking shape in the West, achieving

some autonomy from the state and becoming the basis of the national community, this kind of structural differentiation did not take place in the Ottoman state. For this reason, religion, in the absence of secondary structures similar to those in the West, was the only basis of collective identification. The Ottoman Empire also lacked the kind of organizations that existed in the West for the protection of the interests of specific classes. Under these conditions, only membership in the religious community could give the individual protection (p 29). Another important function of religion in the Ottoman state, according to S. Mardin, with whom B. Toprak agrees, was the maintenance of contacts between the center and the periphery. Religion could perform these functions because it was part of the empire's administrative structure. It was precisely the relatively undifferentiated nature of this structure that caused the religious hierarchy to take on many of the functions performed by government institutions in the West. Jurisdiction and education were under the control of the ulema for almost the entire period of the empire's existence. But the author does not fully clarify the role of the ulema. Toprak believes that the ulema did not always oppose reforms. It is true that its position was quite ambiguous because it had to adapt to new conditions. In general, however, its hostile approach to reforms, it seems to us, is quite obvious, and this is corroborated by many facts. It not only opposed the new commercial law code in the middle of the 19th century, which the author mentions, but also objected to many other Tanzimat reforms. B. Toprak's statement that the 19th-century reformists thought of updating the Ottoman political society in religious terms is also quite debatable. This interpretation of their political views oversimplifies and misrepresents the complex and sometimes contradictory system of their beliefs about necessary reforms. The leaders of the second Tanzimat period, Aali Pasha and Fuad Pasha, definitely advocated the separation of secular and religious spheres in the Ottoman state in their political program. They were quite aware of the distinction. Fuad Pasha even complained about the difficulties the Ottoman state official encountered in connection with the universal role of religion in the society and state. In his words, he and his colleague Aali Pasha had to play the roles of Luther and Calvin. Even in the official acts of the Tanzimat, religious terms were increasingly likely to be replaced by new secular terms. The very doctrine of Ottomanism, which the Tanzimat leaders tried to implement, was the Ottoman Empire's first non-religious substantiation of the common homeland of the empire's Muslims and Christians.

In Chapter Three, "Islam and the Birth of the Nation. The Transformation of Cultural Symbols," B. Toprak examines four forms of secularization: 1. The secularization of symbols--that is, perceptible changes in various aspects of the national culture and social lifestyle associated with Islam. This process was the result of the acquisition of modern scientific knowledge and was related to general cultural progress. In this category the author lists such Kemalist undertakings as the abolition of the caliphate, the translation of the Koran into Turkish, the reform of the written language, the adoption of European dress and the European calendar, etc. 2. Institutional secularization, with the aim of destroying Islam's institutional power: The dissolution of the Sheik-ul-Islam agency and the prohibition of the activities of religious sects and orders which sometimes became centers of opposition to the new regime. One of the most effective Kemalist undertakings in this sphere was the reorganization of the educational system. The author believes

that nationalist indoctrination of youth during Ataturk's presidency left an extremely distinct mark on life in Turkey (p 51). 3. Functional secularization--that is, changes in the functioning and mechanism of religious institutions connected to the administrative system. 4. Legal secularization, including such actions as the 1926 adoption of the Swiss civil code and marriage law and the attempts to emancipate women. The latter was, in the author's opinion, an extremely complex undertaking. It was somewhat successful in urban areas, especially big cities. In rural regions no significant changes were seen for a long time. Statistics for 1972 nevertheless testify, however, that the percentage of polygamous marriages in Turkey is now negligible.

Chapter Four, "Islam and the Political Mobilization of the Turkish Peasantry," begins with the words of American political scientist S. P. Huntington: "Whoever controls the province controls the country" (p 59). Here B. Toprak briefly examines the evolution of Ottoman farming from the Timariot-Sipahi system to modern forms. For many centuries the peasants were isolated from politics in the Ottoman society and were strongly influenced by Islam. This is why religious leaders played such an important role during the period of the Kemalist revolution. The author notes, in particular, that the tax commission (Tekalif-i Milliye Komisyonlari) established during the war of independence was created with the support of clerics. The peasantry's prolonged isolation from politics helped to maintain the cultural distance between the elite and the masses. The Kemalist elite tried to narrow this gap by substituting new symbols and values for the Ottoman court culture. These attempts, however, were not particularly successful. The military-bureaucratic elite of the unipartite system remained just as isolated from the masses as its Ottoman predecessor (p 67).

The author draws a clear distinction between two periods in the history of the Republic of Turkey: the period of the unipartite system with a fairly consistent policy of secularization (she notes the gradual reduction of the number of clerics in the Majlis--from 20 percent in 1920 to 1 percent in 1943), and the period of the multipartite system, from 1946 to the end of the 1970's. It was precisely during the second period that political parties began to encourage peasants to participate in national politics. According to B. Toprak's definition, these were years of political clientelism. Religious slogans were the most accessible and appealing to the millions of peasants in Turkey. The success of the Democratic Party (DP) in the 1950 elections was largely secured by its promises to give the population greater religious freedom. It criticized the Kemalist Republican People's Party (CHP) from a religious standpoint. It is known that the DP government made a number of concessions to clerics in the 1950's. This was followed by more vigorous activity by religious organizations. Budget allocations for religious needs were also increased slightly. Ismet Inenlu and other CHP leaders responded by accusing the DP government of encouraging religious obscurantism.

In Chapter Five, "Islam and Election Campaigns. The Change of Political Aims and the Rise of the National Salvation Party (MSP)," the author analyzes political life in Turkey after the military coup of 1960, including politics in the 1970's. The causes of the gradual growth of the so-called neo-Islamic

party, the MSP, is discussed at length. It inherited not only the votes of the National Order Party, banned in 1971, but also some of the provisions of its program (pp 98-99). The statements by the party's leader, N. Erbakan, combined clerical and nationalist themes. He pointedly criticized the pro-Western orientation of the ruling elite and advised that the European influence be confined to the technological sphere. A large segment of the rural population, attracted by the party's religious slogans, made up the social base of the MSP along with petty merchants and craftsmen. In a discussion of the MSP program, in which militant clericalism was combined with appeals for accelerated industrialization, B. Toprak does not say anything about the incompatibility of the party leader's aims. As if industrialization could be accomplished in isolation from the economic and cultural spheres of life in today's society--and, what is more, under the conditions of a return to semi-theocracy! The author also ignores the obviously demagogic nature of N. Erbakan's criticism of the social injustice in the policy of the CHP government (p 102).

In the conclusion, B. Toprak refers again to the Turkish intellectuals' fear of religion and calls M. Kemal's secularism the line of demarcation between conservatives and reformists (p 122). She loses sight of the fact, however, that this fear was completely justified by the memory of the reforms of the 19th and early 20 centuries and the Kemalists' own experience in encounters with religious reactionaries. Of course, Turkish society today has come a long way since the Kemalist era, but the repeated military coups and the need for the constant repetition of statements in constitutional acts about secularization and the absolutely secular nature of the Turkish state testify to the instability of the secularist traditions dating back to the period of M. Kemal's reforms, and to the possibility of a repetition of the anti-government demonstrations under religious slogans.

Summing up her observations on the role of Islam in Turkish history, B. Toprak suggests the following stages in Turkey's religious evolution:

1. The Ottoman period. Islam conferred a personal identity and political legitimacy in the society. It functioned as a mechanism of social control by maintaining the stability of sociopolitical structures.
2. The period of transition from the empire to the national state. Religion played a dual role. Islam served as a source of national unity against foreign intervention. This period was also marked, however, by religious demonstrations in support of the sultan-caliph and the collaborationist government. Nevertheless, the author believes that the mobilization of the Turkish peasants by nationalist leaders was made possible by their cooperation with local clerics and their use of religious symbols.
3. After the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, religion became a symbol of protest against the authoritarian unipartite regime. During the first decade of the republic's existence, the covert opposition to M. Kemal's secularism sometimes evolved into overt demonstrations by various religious groups.
4. During the period of transition from the unipartite government to the multipartite system, Islam served parties opposing the CHP, according to

B. Toprak, as an instrument for the political mobilization of the masses. The author uses current events to prove that the multipartite system and the bourgeois superstructure in general can be used as an instrument to oppose the prevailing official ideology of several decades' standing.

5. In the middle of the 1960's religion played a significant role in the political struggle and polarization of forces in Turkish society, becoming a serious source of conflict and contributing to the destabilization of the situation in the country and to the military coup of 1971.

In general, although some of the author's opinions are debatable or tendentious, the Turkish author has made a substantial contribution to the investigation of a complex and insufficiently analyzed (despite an abundance of publications) topic.

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